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ABSTRACT

This paper considers the raison d’être of corporations as it is reflected in the
maximands of corporate governance. The debate over stockholders’ versus stakeholders’
interests as such maximands has been raging for decades. Advances in economic theory have
not only failed to resolve this debate but have established that the problem is graver than what
many may have estimated. This paper turns this debate on its head: Instead of asking What or
Whose interests should corporations maximize, the real question is Why is this debate taking
place at all? Aiming to extend current economic analyses of the maximands issue, this paper
puts forward a new theory about the factors that determine these maximands. Recent
advances in psychological research point to value emphases at the individual and societal
levels and to the need for cognitive closure as such factors. The theory proposes the notion of
value complexity as an organizing element that may associate certain value emphases with
cognitive style. Overall, this theory provides explanations for various sticky points in the
stockholder-stakeholder debate in the United States and in international settings, identifies
gaps in other theoretical accounts, and generates testable hypotheses for empirical research.
Extant evidence supports this theory.
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I. INTRODUCTION
For nearly a century now, lawyers and scholars in other fields have been debating the
question Whose interests should corporate fiduciaries maximize? Michael Jensen, among the
founding fathers of modern corporate governance theory, recently argued that “200 years’
worth of work in economics and finance indicates that social welfare is maximized when all
firms in an economy maximize total firm value,” which is defined as the value of equity plus
other financial claims.1 Others, however, call for “corporate social responsibility,” holding
that in addition to shareholders’ interests, corporate officers must give weight to the interests
of other corporate and societal constituencies. The latter are commonly called “stakeholders.”
The list of such potentially eligible stakeholders includes creditors, employees, customers,
local communities, and the environment. This stockholder-stakeholder debate has reached
such scope that some critics remarked, not entirely without merit, that these issues have now
been debated ad nauseam.2
This paper asks a new question that turns this debate on its head. Instead of asking
What or Whose interests should corporations maximize I ask Why is this debate taking place
at all? Unearthing the roots of the stockholder-stakeholder debate has become crucial not
only in the United States but in many other countries as well. Prominent international bodies
and numerous national ones have promulgated codes of principles for optimal corporate

1

Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function,
7 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 297, 302 (2001). Versions of this article appeared in 14 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 8 (2001); 12
BUS. ETHICS Q. 235 (2002); BREAKING THE CODE OF CHANGE 37 (Michael Beer & Nithan Nohia, eds. 2000);
UNFOLDING STAKEHOLDER THINKING _ (Joerg Andriof et al., eds. 2002).
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Henry N. Butler & Fred S. McChesney, Why They Give at the Office: Shareholder Welfare and
Corporate Philanthropy in the Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1195, 1195 (1999)
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governance. These codes invariably call for giving priority to shareholders’ interests while
acknowledging the interests of other stakeholders.3 Yet they give no guidance as to how can
this target be met.
This paper maintains that two hundred years were not enough for resolving the debate
over the maximands of corporate governance.4 My goal is twofold – both constructive and
critical. In the constructive mode, this paper advances a new theory on the maximands of
corporate governance, that identifies crucial but heretofore neglected elements that engender
this problem. In the critical mode, this paper advances a new reading of existing analyses of
corporate constituencies as corporate governance maximands.
Theoretical analyses thus far have failed to provide a satisfactory answer to the
maximands problem. A careful reading of the seminal debate between Adolf Berle and E.
Merrick Dodd indeed shows that several commentators may have misinterpreted this debate.
Contrary to common wisdom, this paper shows that Berle agreed with Dodd that the interests
of non-shareholder constituencies should be advanced by corporate fiduciaries in tandem
with shareholders’ interest. Their disagreement revolved over whether and how this task
could be implemented. Both scholars, however, were unable to answer these questions. As it
happens, the legal literature has made very little progress since Berle first identified this
implementation problem in the early 1930s.

(“For centuries legal, political, social, and economic commentators have debated corporate social responsibility
ad nauseam.”)
3

See below Section V.B.
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The use of the term “maximand” in this context follows FRANK H. EASTERBROOK AND DANIEL R.
FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 35-39 (1991).
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The traditional law and economics perspective holds that in determining the
maximands of the corporation, exclusive priority should be given to its residual claimants.
This, in essence, is the basis for Jensen’s view, in addition to other important commentators.5
This principle appears elegant and appealing at first glance. At each point of time, one only
needs to identify the corporate constituency that holds the residual claim on the corporation.
This residual claim should be the maximand for corporate fiduciaries. By definition, there can
only be a single residual claimant – shareholders in the regular course of business and
creditors during insolvency. Q.E.D.
Well, not quite. The fundamental flaw in this back-of-the-envelope economic analysis
lies in its reliance on the notion of residual claim. This concept is easy to grasp and
employing it is largely consistent with central doctrines of corporate law. Yet this analysis
hides an implicit assumption, that apart from the residual claim all other claims on the
corporation—or, more accurately, the interests of other stakeholders—are fixed and well
defined. Hence, they are assumed away from the analysis such that only the residual claim
remains to be maximized. This assumption is unrealistic, however. A more sensible
analysis—reflected in modern economic theory of the firm—acknowledges that the corporate
enterprise comprises several constituencies whose interests are both interdependent and
indeterminate. As a result, legitimate bona fide disputes can arise with regard to the scope of
entitlements in particular situations. As these interests may be conflicting with one another—
e.g., those of shareholders, creditors, and employees when the firm faces financial or business
hardship—corporate decision makers are forced to consider them all simultaneously. In fact,
these interests must be reconciled on an on-going basis if the firm is to keep functioning.

5

See below Section III.E.1.
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The corporate governance problem therefore is not one of maximizing over a single
factor (the maximand). Rather, it calls for optimizing over several factors simultaneously.
200 years’ worth of work in economics and finance are of little help for this task. Ironically,
it is not even needed. Even high-school level calculus provides that one cannot maximize an
expression with more than a single unknown variable. In a rare treatment of this subject by
economists, Erik Berglöf and Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden opine that the economic approach
to corporate governance should be generalized to a model of multilateral interactions among
a number of different stakeholders. Such a model must also take into account how a country’s
legal and political system affects this delicate balance.6 Important as it may be, these scholars
argue, shareholder protection may not be sufficient for sustainable economic development,
especially in transition economies.7
Economic theory currently fails to offer a framework for dealing with multiple
stakeholders of firms that are run by agents. Recent advances in behavioral economics may
bring some progress in this regard. But, as Berglöf and von Thadden note, in order fully to
generalize the economic analysis of interactions between different stakeholders, this analysis
has to integrate factors that operate at the societal level in addition to the individual level.
Law and politics are such factors. Culture is another factor that is regularly mentioned in the
comparative branch of the stockholder-stakeholder debate. Yet societal-level analysis is an
aspect about which current economic theory faces significant challenges.

6

Erik Berglöf & Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden, The Changing Corporate Governance Paradigm :
Implications for Transition and Developing Countries, in ANNUAL WORLD BANK CONFERENCE ON
DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 135 (1999).
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Id. Berglöf and von Thadden further note, in the wake of the financial crises in Asia and Latin
America, that protecting foreign investors has its limits, as international portfolio investment is a highly volatile
source of funds and cannot be the centerpiece of a development program.
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Every theory of corporate governance is at heart a theory of power. In this view, the
corporation is a nexus of power relationships more than a nexus of contracts. The corporate
setting is rife with agency relationships in which certain parties have the ability (power)
unilaterally to affect the interests of other parties notwithstanding preexisting contractual
arrangements. In the present context, corporate fiduciaries are entrusted with the power to
weigh and prefer the interests of certain constituencies to the interests of others (beyond their
own self-interest). Given the current limitations of economic theory, progress in the analysis
of the maximands of corporate governance may be achieved by drawing on additional
sources of knowledge. This paper points out certain branches of psychology as such sources.
The psychological study of reasoning by policy- and decision-makers in the presence
of conflicting considerations, or interests, reveals that such reasoning varies systematically.
Prominent factors found to be relevant in this regard are people’s cognitive style (i.e., their
typical modes of handling information) and in particular, people’s relative need for cognitive
closure—to wit, their desire to put an end to deliberation and reach an answer, any answer.8
These factors in turn correlate with people’s political views. Meanwhile, another branch of
psychology has established that people from different cultures also differ in their cognitive
styles—among other things, in their treatment of contradiction and their modes of assigning
responsibility. Finally, in yet another field of psychology, universal models of values at the
individual and cultural levels have been advanced and validated. These advances seem to be
taking place independently from one another. An integrative view of these issues has not
been explicated.

8

See below section II.B.1.
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The theoretical framework developed in this paper is based on an integration of the
insights suggested by these psychological studies. The psychological analysis thus
complements the standard economic analysis of the maximands of corporate governance. The
present theory yields specific, testable hypotheses in regards with both the micro level
(individual persons or corporations) as well as the macro level (national and international). At
the micro level, effective corporate governance requires corporate fiduciaries first, to
overcome their self-interest and second, constantly to coordinate the interests of several
constituencies. Especially in pressing times—e.g., during economic downturns or in the face
of a hostile takeover bid—some managers may prove better than others in performing this
task. These managers will exhibit a lesser need to reach cognitive closure; they will tend to be
of a liberal more than conservative or libertarian persuasion;9 their individual values would
emphasize openness to change more than conservation and self-transcendence more than selfenhancement.10 Other managers would exhibit the opposite qualities more. A continuum of
management styles exists between these two extremes. It must be stressed from the outset
that these hypotheses do not imply that the former type of managers would do a better
managerial job than the latter. The opposite probably would be true in many cases. The point
is that certain management styles would vary systematically in accordance with managers’
personal characteristics.

9

These titles of political inclinations have special meanings in American politics and may connote
different meaning in other countries. They are used here for presentation convenience only. Moreover, as will be
made clear below, it may be problematic to use only a single dimension—e.g., left vs. right—to classify
ideological positions. See below note 44 and accompanying text.
10

The concepts mentioned in the text are terms of art. For definitions and theoretical analysis, see
below Section II.B.1.
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Further insights on these issues may be gained by conducting a comparative analysis
of national corporate governance regimes. In contemplating which line of action to choose,
corporate decision makers in the U.S. may consider what the law says and also how the
media and public opinion would respond to their action. In the main, they are likely to prefer
steps that are publicly palatable. When faced with a similar situation, however, German or
Korean managers may take different lines of action in light of differences in the social
environment in which they operate. Assuming the latter managers are equally attentive to the
tastes of the public palate, the German and Korean styles of corporate governance may give
greater weight to non-shareholder constituencies compared with the typical American style.
Stated more generally, managerial action will be affected by what is considered right,
legitimate, or desirable in the society. This type of analysis is related to but is conceptually
different than the above reference to managers’ own individual values. In this context, issues
are analyzed at the general societal level. Social scientists refer to what is considered good,
right, or desirable in the society as culture. It follows that managers in similar situations may
reach different decisions depending on the culture in which they operate. At a more
fundamental level, the law, social norms, and public views are likely to reflect each country’s
general culture.
While some readers at this point might consider the propositions made above as
intuitive and self-evident, it should be stressed that this is entirely not the case. This paper in
fact challenges common wisdom at a number of levels. To begin, the above propositions
reconcile and integrate conflicting theories in current corporate governance research. More
generally, these assertions expand the boundaries of the emerging strand of behavioral law
and economics and its application to corporate governance. These propositions are presented
8

here as testable hypotheses that can be confirmed or refuted empirically. The theory advanced
in this paper thus suggests a new framework for the assessment of foreign corporate
governance systems. This theory also lends itself to the design and implementation of
corporate governance reforms by countries and international bodies alike.
This paper proceeds as follows. Part II lays the foundations for the present theory.
After reviewing basic concepts in the theories of values and cognitive styles, this Part
integrates them relying on the notion of “value complexity.” It then applies the integrated
framework to the problem of corporate governance maximands. Part III revisits the American
stockholder-stakeholder debate. This new reading of the debate highlights the implementation
problem that has bedeviled all proponents of multiple constituencies as maximands from
Dodd to contemporary scholars. Part IV seeks to generalize the scope of discussion by
looking into the field of management studies – a discipline that has been largely ignored by
most legal commentators. In comparison to legal scholarship, writers in this field have made
progress that deserves attention and analysis in light of the present theory. Part V further
extends the analysis by providing a comparative perspective on the maximands problem. This
Part critically reviews recent trends of convergence and harmonization in corporate
governance reform and points out their failure to meaningfully address the maximands
problem. Part VI concludes.

II. FOUNDATIONS FOR A NEW THEORY
A. Foreword
Many corporate governance scholars contend that corporate decision makers cannot
systematically implement the task of advancing the interests of non-shareholder

9

constituencies in parallel with shareholders’ interests.11 To some, the lack of clearly defined
implementation methods implies that managers should focus only on shareholder value
maximization. Others are seemingly unfazed by this implementation problem. Proponents of
both extreme views, however, put their heads in the sand. The needs and claims of nonshareholder constituencies must be addressed if the firm is to continue functioning, and
managers and policy makers can use better advice than simply to deal with problems on an ad
hoc basis.12 The need to better understand the mechanisms underlying the maximands of
corporate governance becomes more pressing with the globalization of financial markets.
Firms and countries alike, both developed and developing, are urged to improve their
corporate governance. But today, this injunction is narrowly construed as a call for improving
public/minority shareholder protection from the opportunism of managers and controlling
shareholders.
The goal of this Part is to advance a systematic framework for the analysis of the
maximands of corporate governance. The foundations of this framework are drawn from
psychological theories that bear on the central controversies in the stockholder-stakeholder
debate – primarily the problem of dealing with competing claims and the managerial
confusion they could entail. Using psychology as the underlying discipline of the present
theory has the advantage of allowing one to address these issues at both the individual and
societal level and to identify factors that operate at both levels. This framework lends itself to
deriving testable hypotheses and, where available, empirical evidence will be presented.

11

For a detailed exposition of this claim, see below Part III.

12

See below Section III.E.3.
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Section B reviews dimensional theories of values at the individual and societal levels.
Section C reviews recent advances in the study of cognitive styles within and across cultures
with a special focus on the need for cognitive closure. I then offer a new integrative
framework for discussing these issues. Section D implements this framework to the subject of
corporate governance maximands. Section E points out supportive evidence.

B. The Value Dimension Framework13
The core concept in the present discussion is values. Values are defined as
conceptions of the desirable that guide the way social actors (e.g., organizational leaders,
policy makers, individual persons) select actions, evaluate people and events, and explain or
justify their actions and evaluations.14 In this view, values are trans-situational criteria or
goals (e.g. security, wealth, justice), ordered by importance as guiding principles in life.
Values are not objective, cold ideas. Rather, when values are activated, they become infused
with feeling. The trans-situational nature of values means that values transcend specific
actions and contexts. Obedience, for example, is relevant at work or in school, in sports or in
business, with family, friends or strangers.
The ways that societal institutions (e.g., the family, education, economic, political,
religious systems) function, their goals and their modes of operation, express cultural value

13

This Section draws on Peter B. Smith & Shalom H. Schwartz, Values, in 3H ANDBOOK OF CROSSCULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY 70 (2nd ed., J.W. Berry et al., eds 1997) and Shalom H. Schwartz, Cultural Value
Differences: Some Implications for Work, 48 APPL’D PSYCHOL. INT’L REV. 23 (1999). Because the current study
employs the framework developed by Schwartz only this model is described in detail. For a review of theories
that draw on the individualism/collectivism dimension developed by Geert Hofstede and Harry Triandis, see
Smith & Schwartz, id., at 88-91. This dimension, however, was first formulated in a cultural-level context.
14

See, generally, Clyde Kluckhohn, Value and Value Orientations in the Theory of Action, in TOWARD A
GENERAL THEORY OF ACTION 383 (Talcott Parsons & Edward A. Shils, eds. 1951); MILTON ROKEACH, THE
NATURE OF HUMAN VALUES (1973); Shalom H. Schwartz, Universals in the Content and Structure of Values:
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priorities. Because cultural value priorities are shared, role incumbents in social institutions
(e.g., leaders in governments, teachers in schools, executive officers of corporations) can
draw upon them to select socially appropriate behavior and to justify their behavioral choices
to others (e.g., to go to war, to punish a child, to fire employees). The explicit and implicit
value emphases that characterize a culture are imparted to societal members through
everyday exposure to customs, laws, norms, scripts, and organizational practices that are
shaped by and express the prevailing values.15
Values thus feature at two distinct levels of analysis: individual and societal (or
cultural). Let us consider them in turn.
1.

The Individual Level

A theory-driven analysis of values begins with identifying the fundamental issues
facing people that define the human condition. Milton Rokeach provided a clear definition of
values as guiding principles in life and proposed a list of values that was supposed to be
universal, comprehensive, and exhaustive.16 Shalom Schwartz and Wolfgang Bilsky analyzed
cross-national data based on a survey instrument developed by Rokeach and confirmed the
existence of certain value types in each country.17 Later on, Schwartz advanced a
comprehensive model of individual-level values that represent universal requirements of

Theoretical Advances and Empirical Tests in 20 Countries, in ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 1
(M. Zanna ed. 1992).
15

See PIERRE BOURDIEU, OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF PRACTICE (1972); Hazel R. Markus & Shinobu
Kitayama, A Collective Fear of the Collective: Implications for Selves and Theories of Selves, 20 PERSONALITY &
SOC’L PSYCHOL. BULL. 568 (1994).
16

ROKEACH, supra note 14.

17

See Shalom H. Schwartz & Wolfgang Bilsky, Towards a Universal Psychological Structure of
Human Values, 53 J. PERSONALITY & SOC’L PSYCHOL. 550 (1987); Shalom H. Schwartz & Wolfgang Bilsky,
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human existence (biological needs, coordination of social interaction, group functioning) as
motivational goals. Schwartz extended the Rokeach value inventory with values drawn from
other cultures, including Asian and African ones. Out of fifty-six values items included in this
inventory, forty-five have been shown to have equivalent content meaning across cultures.18
Table 1 provides definitions of the ten values types distinguished by Schwartz and the value
items that reflect them.
[Table 1 about here]
An interesting feature of Schwartz’s individual-level model is the structural
interrelations among value types. These value types can be drawn as segments of a circle.
Figure 1 depicts this spatial arrangement. Adjacent value types are conceptually close to one
another whereas opposing value types express conceptually diametrical goals in life. Thus,
individual persons that put a high emphasis on values of universalism (social justice,
equality) would also tend to emphasize benevolence values (helpful, honest, etc.).
Respectively, people that emphasize universalism and benevolence would tend to deemphasize values that belong to opposing value types (e.g., achievement versus
benevolence).
[Figure 1 about here]

Towards a Theory of Universal Content and Structure of Values, 58 J. PERSONALITY & SOC’L PSYCHOL. 878
(1990).
18

For instance, “curiosity” has an equivalent meaning across cultures even if people from various
cultures differ in the importance they ascribe to it as a guiding principle. See Shalom H. Schwartz, Universals in
the content and structure of values: Theoretical advances and empirical tests in 20 countries, in 25 ADVANCES IN
EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 1 (M. Zanna Ed. 1992); Shalom H. Schwartz, Are There Universal Aspects
in the Content and Structure of Values? 50 J. SOC’L ISSUES 19 (1994). For this survey Schwartz also created
versions of this inventory in other languages using procedures that ensured their language-equivalence.
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Multidimensional scaling analysis19 has revealed that the values of the ten value types
distinguished by Schwartz are organized along two bipolar orthogonal dimensions. These
dimensions reflect a higher level of conceptual commonality among value types. One
dimension, entitled Self-enhancement versus Self-transcendence, opposes power and
achievement values to universalism and benevolence values.20 The dimension of Openness to
change versus Conservation opposes self-direction and stimulation to security, conformity,
and tradition values. Hedonism values share elements of both Openness to change and Selfenhancement.21 In sum, the Schwartz model provides a nearly universal description of the
content and structural relations of human values at the individual level.22
2.

The Cultural Level

Cross-cultural psychologists have made considerable progress over the last two
decades toward developing a universal analytical framework for comparing cultures.23
Defined in subjective terms, culture is the values, orientations, and underlying assumptions

19

For more detail on the empirical methods used in cross-cultural psychological research, see Amir N.
Licht, The Mother of All Path Dependencies: Toward a Cross-Cultural Theory of Corporate Governance
Systems, 26 DELAWARE J. CORP. L. 147, 173-75 (2001).
20

The names of value dimensions are capitalized throughout to notify that these are terms of art whose
definitional meaning might differ from the common usage of these words.
21

See Smith & Schwartz, supra note 13, at 87-88.

22

There is now substantial supportive evidence that the model Schwartz indeed reflects a universal
structure of human values. See Shalom H. Schwartz et al., Extending the Cross-Cultural Validity of the Theory
of Basic Human Values with a Different Method of Measurement, 32 J. CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOL. 519
(2001); Wolfgang Bilsky & Mareike Koch, On the Content and Structure of Values: Universals or
Methodological Artefacts?, in SOCIAL SCIENCE METHODOLOGY IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM (Jörg Blasius et al.
Eds. 2002).
23

The text only summarizes the core features of the two leading models in this field. For a general
accessible introduction to cross-cultural psychology and additional sources, see Licht, supra note 19. For further
detail, see Schwartz, supra note 13.
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that are prevalent among the members of a society.24 A common postulate in cross-cultural
psychology is that all societies confront similar basic issues or problems when they come to
regulate human activity. The cultural responses to the basic problems that societies face are
reflected, among other things, in prevailing value emphases of individuals.25 Because values
vary in importance, it is possible to characterize societies by the relative importance attributed to
these values in the society using dimensional models. This yields unique cultural profiles for
societies or countries.26
One cannot overstate the importance of the distinction between the individual and the
societal levels of analysis. At the individual level, what is analyzed is the relative importance of
values for the individual person given the general challenges that he or she faces in conducting
their life. At the societal level of analysis what is sought are the societal responses to challenges
that societies face. Although societies do not make conscious decisions or choices they do
struggle with the need to ensure subsistence, establish social order, etc. – some societies more
successfully than others. To illustrate the distinction, it may be noted that giving high priority
to both authority and humility would be incompatible at the individual level: one cannot
conduct one’s life simultaneously seeking authority and trying to be humble in the same

24

This definition is similar to that adopted in studies of the effects of societal development, e.g.,
CULTURE MATTERS: HOW VALUES SHAPE HUMAN PROGRESS (Lawrence E. Harrison & Samuel P. Huntington,
eds., 2000), and widespread in cross-cultural psychology, e.g., HANDBOOK OF CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY
(J.W. Berry, M.H. Segall & C. Kagitcibasi, Eds. 2nd ed. 1997).
25

See, for instance, ROKEACH, supra note 14; FLORENCE R. KLUCKHOHN & FRED L. STRODTBECK,
VARIATIONS IN VALUE ORIENTATIONS (1961).
26

In this paper I use “cultural” and “societal” interchangeably because the present focus is on national
societies. However, it is possible to implement the value dimension framework to study sub-national groups. See
Heather M. Coon & Markus Kemmelmeier, Cultural Orientations in the United States: (Re-)examining
Differences Among Ethnic Groups 32 J. CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOL. 348 (2001).
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situation.27 At the cultural level, however, these values are compatible. “The societal system
will run more smoothly if people accept authority as a desirable basis for organizing human
relations and humility as the appropriate response toward those with greater authority.”28
Thus, the “players” at the two levels of analysis are different, as are the problems they
face and the answers they give to these problems. In comparing cultures, cross-cultural
psychologists take advantage of the fact that general societal orientations—namely, culture—are
reflected in value preferences of individual persons and compare differences in average value
preferences across societies.29
In the wake of his joint work with Bilsky, Schwartz developed a cultural level theory
during the 1990s and validated it in survey data that covered some 55,000 respondents in 67
nations.30 Schwartz derives three bipolar cultural value dimensions from three basic issues he
identifies as confronting all societies: Embeddedness/Autonomy, Hierarchy/Egalitarianism,
and Mastery/Harmony. In coping with these issues, societies exhibit greater or lesser emphasis
on the values at one or the other pole of each dimension. Seven value orientations on which
cultures can be compared derive from the analysis of the bipolar dimensions. The theory also
specifies the structure of relations among these types of values. Table 2 provides definitions of
the cultural value dimensions distinguished by Schwartz. Figure 2 presents graphically the
relations among the value dimensions and orientations.

27

Smith & Schwartz, supra note 13, at 82-83.

28

Id., at 83.

29

See PETER B. SMITH & MICHAEL H.
AND PERSPECTIVES 48-49 (2nd ed. 1998).
30

BOND, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY ACROSS CULTURES: ANALYSIS

See Schwartz, supra note 13.
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[Table 2 about here]
[Figure 2 about here]
Another pioneering and still influential dimensional framework for characterizing
cultures was advanced by Geert Hofstede.31 His framework is widely used today in studies on
management and accounting.32 Hofstede identified four—and later, five—value dimensions:
Individualism/Collectivism, Power Distance, Uncertainty Avoidance, Masculinity/Femininity,33
and Long-term Orientation.34 Table 3 provides definitions of the cultural value dimensions
distinguished by Hofstede.
[Table 3 about here]

31

See GEERT H. HOFSTEDE, CULTURE’S CONSEQUENCES: INTERNATIONAL DIFFERENCES IN WORKRELATED VALUES (1980) (hereinafter “CULTURE’S CONSEQUENCES 1980”); GEERT HOFSTEDE, CULTURE’S
CONSEQUENCES: COMPARING VALUES, BEHAVIORS, INSTITUTIONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS ACROSS NATIONS (2d
ed. 2001) (hereinafter “CULTURE’S CONSEQUENCES”); GEERT H. HOFSTEDE, CULTURES AND ORGANIZATIONS:
SOFTWARE OF THE MIND (1991) (hereinafter “SOFTWARE OF THE MIND”).
32

See Peter B. Smith, The End of the Beginning?, 1 INT’L J. CROSS-CULTURAL MGMT. 21 (2001). See
also STEPHEN P. ROBBINS & MARY COULTER, MANAGEMENT 125-29 (6th ed 1999) (arguing that “[t]he most
valuable framework to help managers better understand differences between national cultures was developed by
Geert Hofstede.”); RICHARD MEAD, INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT: CROSS-CULTURAL DIMENSIONS (2nd ed.
1998) (drawing on Hofstede’s theory); Greame Harrison & Jill L. McKinnon, Cross-Cultural Research in
Management Control System Design: A Review of the Current State, 24 ACTG ORG. & SOC. 483 (1998) (same).
Hofstede’s work has also stirred objections on various grounds over the years. For a review and discussion of
common objections, see HOFSTEDE, CULTURE’S CONSEQUENCES, id., at 73; see also Ulrich Schimmack,
Shigehiro Oishi, & Ed Diener, Individualism: A Valid and Important Dimension of Cultural Differences
(Working paper 2002), available at http://www.erin.utoronto.ca/~w3psyuli/msIndividualism.pdf.
33

This label has elicited negative responses. Writing originally in 1980, Hofstede was well aware of the
problematic of attributing certain qualities to particular genders. He nonetheless kept this dimension, arguing
that it reflects a positive reality that is independent of its normative undesirability. HOFSTEDE, CULTURE’S
CONSEQUENCES 1980, supra note 31, at 189-90. In the 2001 edition, Hofstede follows the modern distinction
between sex and gender and uses the latter term when referring to social function. HOFSTEDE, CULTURE’S
CONSEQUENCES, supra note 31, at 280. For further discussions, see GEERT H. HOFSTEDE & WILLEM A.
ARRINDELL, MASCULINITY AND FEMININITY: THE TABOO DIMENSION OF NATIONAL CULTURES (1998).
34

This value dimension was not included in Hofstede’s original study. It was added later, in HOFSTEDE,
SOFTWARE OF THE MIND, supra note 31, in light of a study led by Michael Bond. There, it was named
“Confucian work dynamism.” See Chinese Cultural Connection, Chinese Values and the Search for CultureFree Dimensions of Culture, 18 J. CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOL. 143 (1987). Notwithstanding its apparent link to
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Based on their value priorities, countries can further be classified into cultural regions.
Hofstede’s analysis yielded the following regions: Anglo, Germanic, Nordic, two Latin
regions, two Asian regions (one consisting only of Japan), and Near Eastern.35 Schwartz
identified six cultural groups of nations: English-speaking, West European, East European,
Far Eastern, Latin American, and African.36 A broader, more recent sample suggests that the
Far Eastern cultural region comprises two sub-regions: South Asian and Confucian.37

C. Cognitive Styles, Complexity, and Values
1.

The Need for Cognitive Closure and Complexity

One of the basic tasks that people constantly face is to acquire and construct
knowledge. The cognitive processes of knowledge acquisition are the subject of an evergrowing psychological literature. Among the factors that influence these processes is the need
for cognitive closure, defined by Arie Kruglanski as “the desire for a definite answer on some
topic, any answer as opposed to confusion and ambiguity.”38 The need for cognitive closure
is primarily motivational. That is, “need” denotes “a motivational tendency or proclivity
rather than a tissue deficit.”39 Cognitive closure is a goal that can bias individuals’ choices

Asian cultures it is arguably a universal dimension. Data for this dimension cover a smaller set of countries and
it is not commonly used in the literature.
35

HOFSTEDE, CULTURE’S CONSEQUENCES 1980, supra note 31
, at 333 -36. Note that the classification
into more and less economically developed cultural regions dates from 1980.
36

Schwartz, supra note 13, at 35-39.

37

Shalom H. Schwartz, Relations of Culture to Social Structure, Demography and Policy in the Study
of Nations, invited lecture delivered at the 25th International Congress of Applied Psychology, Singapore, July
2002 (on file with author). The Confucian region consists of China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea,
Singapore, and Japan—though Japan differs some from the others.
38

ARIE W. KRUGLANSKI, LAY EPISTEMICS AND HUMAN KNOWLEDGE: COGNITIVE AND MOTIVATIONAL
BASES 14 (1989) (emphasis in the original).
39

Arie W. Kruglanski & Donna M. Webster, Motivated Closing of the Mind: "Seizing" and "Freezing",
103 PSYCHOL. REV. 263, 264 (1996).
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when they are faced with the need to acquire new knowledge (including updating existing
knowledge) in order to make decisions. This is because cognitive processes are costly: they
take time and entail mental effort. Achieving cognitive closure is thus accompanied by
positive affective reaction, and vice versa when the attainment of closure is threatened.40
The need for cognitive closure concept is close to similar constructs advanced earlier
by psychologists such as closed mindedness,41 certainty vs. uncertainty orientation, and need
for cognition.42 These constructs have been strongly associated with political conservatism—
defined as general resistance to change and endorsement of inequality—in light of a wide
array of psychological theories that relate political conservatism with “a generalized
susceptibility to experiencing threat or anxiety in the face of uncertainty.”43 44 The need for

40

Lucia Mannetti et al., A Cross Cultural Study of the Need for Cognitive Closure Scale: Comparing
Its Structure in Croatia, Italy, the USA and the Netherlands, 41 BRIT. J. SOC’L PSYCHOL. 139, 140 (2002).
41

See MILTON ROKEACH, THE OPEN AND THE CLOSED MIND (1960).

42

Kruglanski & Webster, supra note 39, at 264. Sorrentino and Roney trace the possible roots of
certainty/uncertainty orientation to people’s early childhood development. RICHARD M. SORRENTINO &
CHRISTOPHER J.R. RONEY, THE UNCERTAIN MIND: INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN FACING THE UNKNOWN 7
(2000) (“From a psychodynamic approach, the [certainty-oriented person] likely did not make it through the
oral, anal, and phallic stages of development very successfully. Consequently, this person developed a basic
mistrust in the world, a lack of sense of autonomy, and a desire to adhere to predictable and familiar worlds.”);
see also Richard M. Sorrentino & J.A.C. Short, Uncertainty Orientation, Motivation, and Cognition, in THE
HANDBOOK OF MOTIVATION AND COGNITION: FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 379, 400 (Richard M.
Sorrentino & E. Tory Higgins Eds. 1986)) (same, but without reference to the phallic stage). Sorrentino and
Roney note that even without reliance on “the excessive baggage of Freudian and Eriksonian thought that many
find unpalatable today,” early childhood development probably accounts for certainty versus uncertainly
orientation. These authors further speculate that these orientations might be related to inborn dispositions. Under
either theory, such orientation would be difficult to alter in adult age. SORRENTINO & RONEY, id., at 157-58.
43

John T. Jost et al., Political Conservatism as Motivated Social Cognition, 129 PSYCHOL. BULL. 339,
347 (2003) (hereinafter Political Conservatism) (citing Glenn D. Wilson, A Dynamic Theory of Conservatism, in
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONSERVATISM 257, 259 (Glenn D. Wilson Ed. 1973)). For a critique on this general
thesis and a forceful rejoinder, see, respectively, Jeff Greenberg & Eva Jonas, Psychological Motives and
Political Orientation—The Left, the Right, and the Rigid: Comment on Jost et al. (2003), 129 PSYCHOL. BULL.
376 (2003); John T. Jost et al., Exceptions That Prove the Rule—Using a Theory of Motivated Social Cognition
to Account for Ideological Incongruities and Political Anomalies: Reply to Greenberg and Jonas (2003), 129
PSYCHOL. BULL. 383 (2003). Notwithstanding the fact that it summarizes research of several decades, Jost et
al.’s article raised vocal objections from right-wing groups shortly after its publication in the summer of 2003.
See, e.g., Vicki Haddock, The Right Stuff: Getting in Touch with the Mussolini Inside: A Trip Inside the
Conservative Mind is a Perilous Journey Indeed, THE SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, Aug. 3, 2003, at D2; Byron

19

cognitive closure involves tendencies to “seize” and “freeze” upon information that is readily
accessible (simply stated: stick to what first comes to mind). Notwithstanding its motivational
nature, this phenomenon is therefore also referred to as a cognitive style because it relates to
modes of handling information.45 Individuals differ from one another in their stable degree of
preference for closure and they differ across situations in the extent to which they are open to
novel information and are willing to invest the cognitive effort required for adjusting their
knowledge base.46
Kruglanski, Webster, and Klem have developed and validated a scale (survey
questionnaire) for measuring the degree of individual need for cognitive closure. Statistical
analysis revealed that the scale items point to five factors representing this concept:
preference for order and structure, preference for predictability, decisiveness of judgment and

York, The “Conservatives Are Crazy” Study: Paid For by Taxpayers, THE NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE, Aug. 1,
2003, available at http://www.nationalreview.com/york/york080103.asp; David Fein, Psychological Study Links
Hitler to Reagan, Limbaugh, available at http://www.crosswalk.com/news/1211434.html (visited Aug. 19,
2003).
44

A thorny issue, which the various authors, supra notes 50-43, abstract from, and this paper will
therefore follow suit, is the validity of classifying political ideologies and orientations along a uni-dimensional
left-right or conservative-liberal continuum. Philip Tetlock advances the proposition that “it is impossible to
create a psychometrically defensible one-dimensional measure of ideology.” Tetlock empirically derives two
such dimensions: high/low traditional conservatism and high/low market libertarianism. Philip E. Tetlock,
Cognitive Biases and Organizational Correctives: Do Both Disease and Cure Depend on the Ideological
Beholder?, 45 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 293 (2001) (citing HERBERT MCCLOSKY & ALIDA BRILL, THE DIMENSIONS OF
TOLERANCE: WHAT AMERICANS BELIEVE ABOUT CIVIL LIBERTIES (1983); Donald R. Kinder, Opinion and
Action in the Realm of Politics, in 2 HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 778 (D. Gilbert et al. Eds. 4th ed.
1998)). Shalom Schwartz similarly notes that “students of politics have identified two major dimensions of
political ideology on which parties in various countries are differentiated.” One is concerned with civil liberties
and law and order; the other with economic issues. Shalom H. Schwartz, Value Priorities and Behavior:
Applying a Theory of Integrated Value Systems, in ONTARIO SYMPOSIUM ON SOCIAL AND PERSONALITY
PSYCHOLOGY: VALUES 1, 10 (Clive Seligman, James M. Olson, & Mark P. Zanna Eds., 1996).
45

See Kruglanski & Webster, supra note 39, at 267; see also John T. Jost, Arie W. Kruglanski, &
Linda Simon, Effects of Epistemic Motivation on Conservatism, Intolerance, and Other System-Justifying
Attitudes, in SHARED COGNITION IN ORGANIZATIONS: THE MANAGEMENT OF KNOWLEDGE 91, 93 (L. Thompson,
J. M. Levine, & D. M. Messick Eds. 1999).
46

See Kruglanski & Webster, supra note 39, at 264.
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choices, discomfort with ambiguity, and closed-mindedness.47 Recent research shows that the
need for cognitive closure as captured by the Kruglanski and Webster scale exhibits a similar
dimensional structure in samples from the United States, Croatia, Italy, and The
Netherlands,48 and, separately, among Hong Kong Chinese.49 Using this scale, Kruglanski,
Webster, and colleagues have demonstrated that the need for cognitive closure produces
similar consequences whether this need was evoked situationally (e.g., by time pressure or by
ambient noise) or as an individual personality characteristic.50
Thus, the evidence shows that the need for cognitive closure is a universal trait but
that its actual manifestations vary among individuals and across situations. Research in
another field of psychology, judgment and decision making, may be helpful in identifying the
factors that influence this variation. The pivotal observation here is that cognitive processes
are taxing for individuals. This is strongly evidenced by the phenomenon of cognitive
heuristics, that allow for fast and frugal reasoning albeit at the price of systematic errors.51

47

Arie W. Kruglanski, Donna M. Webster, & Adena Klem, Motivated Resistance and Openness to
Persuasion in the Presence or Absence of Prior Information, 65 J. PERSONALITY & SOC’L PSYCHOL. 861
(1993); Donna M. Webster & Arie W. Kruglanski, Individual Differences in Need for Cognitive Closure, 67 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC’L PSYCHOL. 1049 (1994).
48

Mannetti et al., supra note 40. Note that as this analysis was conducted at the individual level, its
findings do not indicate that people from different cultures exhibit similar levels of need for closure – only that
the need for cognitive closure is a construct that could be applied cross-culturally. Mannetti et al. argue,
however, that the scale items that reflect the decisiveness subdimension are probably susceptible to Western
cultural bias that values quick decision making. Id., at 152-53. For an application of the need for closure scale in
Germany without reporting on subdimenstional structure, see Markus Kemmelmeier, Political Orientation and
Need for Cognitive Closure in German University Students, 137 J. SOC’L PSYCHOL 787 (1997).
49

See Chi-yue Chiu, Michael W. Morris, Ying-yi Hong, & Tanya Menon, Motivated Cultural
Cognition: The Impact of Implicit Theories on Dispositional Attribution Varies as a Function of Need for
Closure, 78 J. PERSONALITY & SOC’L PSYCHOL. 247 (2000).
50

For further discussion and concentration of references, see Jost et al., Political Conservatism, supra
note 43, at 348.
51

See GERD GIGERENZER, PETER M. TODD, & THE ABC RESEARCH GROUP, SIMPLE HEURISTICS THAT
MAKE US SMART (2000) (a collection of studies demonstrating how heuristics (“cognitive biases”) can enable
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Human decision strategies change depending on a number of factors, including the decision’s
perceived importance, motivation, time pressure, and the complexity of the decision. Payne,
Bettman and Johnson have emphasized the role of minimizing the cognitive effort involved
in decision making. They have argued that complex decisions involving many alternatives are
more taxing and lead people to adopt simplifying heuristics.52
In the economic literature, Sonsino and colleagues have documented “complexityaversion”, or “negative complexity effects in choice with uncertainty.” In particular, they
show that more complex alternatives are less likely to be chosen, and that noise in the choice
process increases with complexity.53 Cognitive complexity was studied earlier in connection
with individuals’ political ideology. As defined by Tetlock, individuals’ integrative
complexity refers to the extent of differentiation among multiple perspectives or dimensions
and the higher order integration or synthesis of these differentiated components.54 In political
decision making of voters, cognitive heuristics are at times employed by almost all voters,
and that they are particularly likely to be used when the choice situation facing voters is
complex.55

both living organisms and artificial systems to make smart choices, judgments, and predictions by employing
bounded rationality).
52

JOHN W. PAYNE, JAMES R. BETTMAN, & ERIC J. JOHNSON, THE ADAPTIVE DECISION MAKER 29-41
(1993); see also James R. Bettman, Eric J. Johnson, & John W. Payne, A Componential Analysis of Cognitive
Effort in Choice, 45 ORG. BEHAVIOR & HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES 111 (1990).
53

See Doron Sonsino, Uri Benzion, Galit Mador, The Complexity Effects on Choice with Uncertainty –
Experimental Evidence, 112 ECON. J. 936, 937 (2002); see also Doron Sonsino & Marvin Mandelbaum, On
Preference for flexibility and Complexity Aversion – Experimental Evidence, 51 EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE,
THEORY AND DECISION 197 (2001) (showing that increasing the number of options produces a negative
complexity effect).
54

See Philip E. Tetlock, Cognitive Style and Political Ideology, 45 J. PERSONALITY & SOC’L PSYCHOL.
118 (1983); Philip E. Tetlock, Cognitive Style and Political Belief Systems in the British House of Commons, 46
J. PERSONALITY & SOC’L PSYCHOL. 365 (1984).
55

See Richard Lau & David Redlawsk, Advantages and Disadvantages of Cognitive Heuristics in
Political Decision Making, 45 AM. J. POL. SC. 951 (2001)
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Taken together, this evidence points to the likely connection between complexity and
the need for cognitive closure—namely, more complex tasks entail greater cognitive effort,
which more strongly invokes the need for cognitive closure. Research in cultural psychology
supports this proposition in demonstrating that when the level of need for cognitive closure
rises, people are more likely to fall back on “standard solutions” to problems suggested by
their culture. In ambiguous, complex social interactions, culture provides easily accessible
heuristics for reaching satisfactory solutions. These solutions differ systematically with
people’s culture, however.56
Examination of the content of the need for closure construct suggests that it is closely
related to the Conservation versus Openness to change dimension (see Table 1). The
subscales that are captured in Kruglanski and Webster’s scale and the items that reflect them
overlap conceptually with the values of security, tradition, and conformity in Schwartz’s
model on the one hand versus self-direction and stimulation values on the other hand. The
emphasis on preserving the status quo—whether real or an imaginary ideal thereof (consider
“preserving family values”)—is especially clear in such value items as respect for tradition,
honoring parents and elders, and social order. The preference for certainty over ambiguity
and change is also reflected in seemingly innocuous value items like cleanliness that convey a
sense of clarity.57

56

See Ho-Ying Fu & Michael W. Morris, Which Romans Do "as Romans Do"? Individual Differences
in Conformity to Cultural Conflict Resolution Scripts, (Working paper 2002), available at
http://gobi.stanford.edu/researchpapers/detail1.asp?Paper_No=1660 (showing that both American and Chinese
subjects with higher levels of need for cognitive closure tended to rely more on their cultures’ (different)
standard scripts for dispute resolution); Chiu et al., supra note 49, at 256 (“What cultural knowledge provides to
the individual is a set of highly accessible cognitive tools that can be applied to a problem to reach a quick
interpretation and articulation of one’s answer.”) Note that these findings also corroborate the evidence that
individuals’ behavior tends to comply with their values. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
57

Cf. Jost et al., Political Conservatism, supra note 43, at 346.
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The need for closure may also be related to the Self-enhancement versus Selftranscendence dimension. Self-transcendence, reflected in values of benevolence and
universalism, calls for considering multiple others in addition to considering oneself. To the
extent that values participate significantly in affecting behavioral choices, people who see
merit in multiple considerations would exhibit lesser need to reach cognitive closure, and vice
versa for individuals who are higher on power and achievement values. Studies done by
Philip Tetlock and colleagues indirectly support these hypotheses and the association of
higher need for cognitive closure with political conservatism.58 Studies by Schwartz and
colleagues demonstrate relations of value priorities to behavior, some of it directly relevant to
the liberal-conservative distinction.59 Further research of this subject is clearly warranted.
The above findings and observations suggest that the need for cognitive closure can
be more systematically related to Schwartz’s universal model of individual value dimensions.
I propose that the notion of complexity may be a helpful organizing element for this purpose.
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See, e.g., Tetlock, supra note 44; Philip E. Tetlock, The Impact of Accountability on Judgment and
Choice: Toward a Social Contingency Model, in 25 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 331
(Mark P. Zanna, Ed. 1992); Philip E. Tetlock, L. Skitka, & R. Boettger, Social and Cognitive Strategies for
Coping with Accountability: Conformity, Complexity, and Bolstering, 57 J. PERSONALITY & SOC’L PSYCHOL.
632 (1989). For further discussion, see Philip E. Tetlock & Jennifer S. Lerner, The Social Contingency Model:
Identifying Empirical and Normative Boundary Conditions on the Error-and-Bias Portrait of Human Nature, in
DUAL PROCESS THEORIES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 571 (Shelly Chaiken & Yaacov Trope, Eds. 1999); Jennifer
S. Lerner & Philip E. Tetlock, Accountability and Social Cognition, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR
(1994).
59

See Schwartz, supra note 44; Marina Barnea & Shalom H. Schwartz, Values and Voting, 19
POLITICAL PSYCHOL. 17 (1998); Anat Bardi & Shalom H. Schwartz, Values and Behavior: Strength and
Structure of Relations, PERSONALITY & SOC’L PSYCHOL. BULL (forthcoming 2003). To be sure, the path from
values to behavior is complicated and involves several mediating factors. One would be misguided to expect a
unique deterministic link between values and behavior—in the least, because many values that belong to
opposing value types are viewed positively by many people (see Table 1), such that contradicting values may be
activated as a matter of course. Cf. C. M., Kristiansen, & A. M. Hotte, Morality and the Self: Implications for
When and How of Value-Attitude-Behavior Relations. in ONTARIO SYMPOSIUM ON SOCIAL AND PERSONALITY
PSYCHOLOGY: VALUES 77 (Clive Seligman, James M. Olson, & Mark P. Zanna Eds., 1996) (questioning the
causal relations between values and behavior); Kwok Leung, Michael Harris Bond, & Shalom H. Schwartz,
How to Explain Cross-Cultural Differences: Values, Valences, and Expectancies?, 1 ASIAN J. PSYCHOL. 70
(1995) (discussing mediating factors).
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In line with research on complexity and cognitive effort, greater complexity is associated
with a greater number of relevant elements worthy of consideration and higher uncertainty
and ambiguity. Values therefore may differ in the level of complexity they feature. Values
whose subject is multifaceted or involves multiple issues (persons, entities, etc.) or is more
ambiguous may be deemed more complex, and vice versa. In this view, Openness to change
and Self-transcendence may be considered more complex than Conservation and Selfenhancement, respectively.
It follows that adhering to values of the former two dimensional poles entails greater
cognitive complexity than adhering to values of the latter poles. Hence, compliance with
higher-complexity values would be more likely to induce a need for cognitive closure in
individuals. After all, if the need for cognitive closure can vary as a function of internal
individual traits and external environmental circumstances, one may be justified in expecting
similar variance as a function of the object of behavior—specifically, as a function of the
complexity of values that underlie such behavior.
2.

Cognitive Styles Across Cultures

For several decades, most psychologists have assumed that basic cognitive processes
are universal: Every human being is equipped with the same set of attentional, memorial,
learning, and inferential procedures.60 Cognitive scientists’ endorsement of the universalistic

60

This is only one basic assumption out of several. The literature on culture and cognition is
outpouring. For sample reviews, on which the following paragraphs draw liberally, see Richard E. Nisbett &
Ara Norenzayan, Culture and Cognition, in STEVENS' HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY: COGNITION
561 (D. L. Medin Ed. 3d Ed. 2001); Richard E. Nisbett et al., Cultures as Systems of Thought: Holistic versus
Analytic Cognition, 108 PSYCHOL. REV. 291 (2001); Kaiping Peng, Daniel R. Ames, & Eric Knowles, Culture
and Human Inference, in HANDBOOK OF CULTURE AND PSYCHOLOGY 245 (D. Matsumoto Ed. 2001); Alan P.
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position was encouraged by the analogy between the human mind and the computer: brain =
hardware, cognitive procedures = operating principles and factory-installed software.61 The
heuristics and biases movement started by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky encouraged
the view that procedures such as judgment of probability by the representativeness heuristic
and judgment of frequency by the availability heuristic, were primary, universal, and difficult
to alter.62
Evidence that has accumulated mostly since the late 1990s now casts doubt on the
universality assumption about cognitive processes. Among other things, studies indicate that
cognitive styles differ markedly across cultures. That is, people from different cultures
perceive, understand, and judge the world in systematically different ways. Cultural
differences in cognitive processes are further tied to cultural differences in basic assumptions
about the nature of the world. Cultural practices encourage and sustain certain kinds of
cognitive processes, which then perpetuate these cultural practices.63
The vast majority of empirical studies compared Western subjects (mostly American)
with East Asian subjects (mostly Chinese and Korean). For instance, Americans were more
inclined to assign causality and responsibility to individual group members in agency
situations, while the Asians were more inclined to assign causality to attributes of the group

Fiske et al., The Cultural Matrix of Social Psychology, in HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 915 (D. T.
Gilbert, S. T. Fiske, & G. Lindzey Eds., 4th ed. 1998).
61

Nisbett & Norenzayan, id., at 561 (citing N. Block, The Mind as the Software of the Brain, in
THINKING: AN INVITATION TO THE COGNITIVE SCIENCE 377 (E. E. Smith & D. N. Osherson Eds.1995)). Note,
anecdotally, that Hofstede considered culture to be the software of the mind. HOFSTEDE, SOFTWARE OF THE
MIND, supra note 31.
62

Nisbett & Norenzayan, supra note 61, at 561. For a law-oriented discussion, see Donald C.
Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision Making in Legal Scholarship: A Literature Review,
51 VAND. L. REV. 1499 (1998). See also Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral
Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998).
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as a whole.64 In explaining causes of behavior, Asians more than Americans placed credence
on situational and interactional factors.65 Asians were also better able than Americans to
recognize the influence of situational constraints on individual behavior: Americans were
more susceptible to the fundamental attribution error.66 On the other hand, Asians were more
susceptible to the hindsight bias, believing that they could have predicted outcomes that in
fact one could not have predicted.67 This finding may stem from the fact that in analyzing a
situation, Asians consider more factors as relevant than Americans do.68
To conceptualize the differences between subjects’ cultures, cultural psychologists
draw on the distinction between conceptions of the self as independent versus interdependent,
suggested by Hazel Markus and Shinobu Kitayama.69 In this view, the Western construal of
the self is characterized by a sense of autonomy and distinctiveness from others. In the East
Asian construal of the self, one’s identity is diffused socially across significant others in
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Nisbett & Norenzayan, supra note 61, at 561-62.
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Tanya Menon et al., Culture and the Construal of Agency: Attribution to Individual versus Group
Dispositions, 76 J. PERSONALITY & SOC’L PSYCHOL. 701 (1999).
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Ara Norenzayan, Incheol Choi, & Richard E. Nisbett, Cultural Similarities and Differences in Social
Inference: Evidence from Behavioral Predictions and Lay Theories of Behavior, 28 PERSONALITY & SOC’L
PSYCHOL. BUL. 109 (2002).
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Incheol Choi & Richard E. Nisbett, Situational Salience and Cultural Difference in the
Correspondence Bias and Actor-Observer Bias, 24 PERSONALITY & SOC’L PSYCHOL. BUL. 949 (1998).
Originally thought to be a universal phenomenon, the fundamental attribution error, also known as the
correspondence bias, is people’s tendency to consistently ignore external situational explanations in favor of
internal dispositional explanations. This means that people are more likely to conclude that something about the
person caused her behavior rather than something about the situation, even when the situation already provides
an adequate explanation. See Lee Ross, The Intuitive Psychologist and His Short-comings: Distortions in the
Attribution Process, in 10 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 184 (Leonard Berkowitz ed.
1977).
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Incheol Choi & Richard E. Nisbett, The Cultural Psychology of Surprise: Holistic Theories and
Recognition of Contradiction, 79 J. PERSONALITY & SOC’L PSYCHOL 890 (2000).
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Incheol Choi, R. Dalal, C. Kim-Prieto, & Hyekyong Park, Culture and Judgment of Causal
Relevance, 84 J. PERSONALITY & SOC’L PSYCHOL. 46 (2003).
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one’s in-group.70 These polar views are close to the polar orientations on Schwartz’s
Autonomy/Embeddedness dimension. They are also reminiscent of, but not identical to
Hofstede’s and Harry Triandis’ Individualism/Collectivism distinction.71 Explanations for
these and many other striking cultural differences in cognitive styles call upon differences in
reasoning traditions that go back to ancient times – possibly to the era of Confucius and
Aristotle.72
Compared with other aspects of cognition, relatively less attention so far has been
paid to the need for cognitive closure across cultures. It is now assumed that in addition to
individual characteristics and environmental factors, culture may also affect the level of
people’s need for cognitive closure. This hypothesis is inspired by Hofstede’s Uncertainty
Avoidance dimension.73 It should be emphasized, however, that the need for cognitive
closure construct applies at the individual level, not the societal level. Societies do not
perform cognitive processes and they cannot experience a need for cognitive closure in the
sense defined by Kruglanski as “a desire for a definite answer… any answer.”
Preliminary evidence suggests that people in different cultures vary in their typical
level of need for cognitive closure. Chiu et al. administered the Kruglanski and Webster scale
to Hong Kong Chinese and to non-Asian Americans. They found that compared to the
Chinese participants, Americans participants scored lower on the subscales that reflect
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Hazel R. Markus & Shinobu Kitayama, Culture and the Self: Implication for Cognition, Emotion,
and Motivation, 98 PYSCHOL. REV. 224 (1991).
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Peng et al., supra note 60, at 248.
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See HARRY C. TRIANDIS, INDIVIDUALISM AND COLLECTIVISM (1995).
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See Fiske et al., supra note 60, at 322-24.
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See Jost et al., Political Conservatism, supra note 43, at 348 (citing Hofstede).
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preference for predictability, discomfort with ambiguity, and closed-mindedness. Americans
scored higher on the subscale of decisiveness; they had a greater preference for a quick and
confident decision on one best solution to a problem.74 This finding, the authors argue, is in
line with broader views in the cultural psychology literature on cognitive styles.75
Compared with Western systems of thought, the East Asian systems of thought (as
these are conceptualized in this literature) are more holistic. According to Nisbett et al., the
holistic approach, as opposed to the Western analytic thought, puts “an emphasis on change,
a recognition of contradiction and of the need for multiple perspectives, and a search for the
"Middle Way" between opposing propositions.”76 East Asian subjects have been found to be
more tolerant to apparent contradictions and in fact exhibit a clear preference for
contradicting, dialectical statements.77 The metaphor of cultures as “systems of thought”
vividly captures this pattern.78
3.

Cultural Orientations, Complexity, and Need for Closure

The aforementioned evidence raises the question whether we should expect a
systematic relationship to exist between cultural orientations and societal stances toward
cognitive closure? In line with the proposition regarding the individual level, I propose that
such relationships are to be expected, and argue that these relationships may be better
understood in light of the notion of complexity. At the societal level, cultural orientations too
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Chiu et al., supra note 49, at 252. On the relations between these subscales see supra note 48.
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See Chiu et al., supra note 49, at 252-53.
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Nisbett et al., supra note 60, at 11.
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See Kaiping Peng & Richard E. Nisbett, Culture, Dialectics, and Reasoning about Contradiction, 54
AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 741 (1999).
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may be considered more complex if adherence to their values necessitates consideration of a
greater number of relevant factors or should be more nuanced. Let us thus examine which
cultural orientations may be considered more cognitively demanding to comply with.
In this analysis, Embeddedness and Egalitarianism imply greater complexity. Social
appropriateness in high Embeddedness societies depends on preserving relationships with
numerous others, the Confucian ideal of social structure that rests on the “Five Relationships”
being a prime example.79 In contrast, the focus of Autonomy is primarily on the thoughts and
feeling of the individual. The thoughts and feelings of others are of secondary importance.
Stated otherwise, an East Asian likely has many more “significant others” than a Western
person. The literature on the Asian holistic, multifaceted system of thought extends this
pattern to non-human contexts as well. Conducting one’s life in an idea-type Confucian
society thus may be more cognitively demanding.
Egalitarianism similarly implies greater complexity than Hierarchy. Egalitarianism
emphasizes the moral equality of people such that numerous societal members or groups are
seen as relevant factors for decision. An egalitarian cultural orientation therefore appears
more cognitively demanding as it invites deliberation over pros and cons and weighing of
multiple claims. Speedy attainment of cognitive closure may be detrimental to this process
and may therefore be discouraged in egalitarian cultures. In contrast, Hierarchy connotes a
clear social order in which people know their place relative to one another and can more
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easily ascertain whose judgment should prevail in social interactions. Hierarchy simplifies
things considerably by legitimizing what comes from above.
The Harmony/Mastery dimension may be more ambiguous in what regards its
complexity. Harmony appears to entail greater complexity than Mastery in that Harmony
expresses an integrative view of the natural and social world. People in societies high on
Harmony are encouraged to internalize this view and subject their desires to some general
order that they need to comprehend. In contrast, Mastery calls on people to change things at
their own initiative, thus implying less consideration for others. The latter orientation,
however, entails greater uncertainty that people are expected to adjust to.
Societies whose cultural orientations are more complex should develop means for
accommodating the greater cognitive load that these orientations impose on societal
members. As cultures evolve over generations, they may adopt strategies for allowing
societal members to optimize the cognitive effort required for complying with their values.80
One strategy for facilitating optimization of cognitive effort bears on the payoffs from
engaging in it by individuals. Along this line, cultures may develop social norms that
encourage or discourage speedy attainment of cognitive closure. Thus, people who live in
societies characterized by high-complexity cultural orientations would be socially rewarded
for their ability to withstand the enhanced need for cognitive closure. (and vice versa). This
social esteem would compensate people for the potential disutility of the extended cognitive
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process.81 Because multifacetedness and ambiguity are inherent to the promotion of societal
values, it may not be surprising if satisfying the desire for cognitive closure would be
perceived as immature in these cultures.
An alternative strategy for dealing with greater complexity is, simply put, to lower the
pressure. When a particular culture puts greater emphasis on values, whose promotion
typically entails greater cognitive effort, societal members may develop a cognitive style that,
on average, gives lesser importance to reaching cognitive closure. By contrast, societies
whose values generally call for narrowing the focus of attention will also socialize their
members to be intolerant to lengthy and convoluted reasoning.
Finally, cultures could develop institutions that reduce the uncertainty and ambiguity
perceived by societal members (perhaps irrespectively to the complexity of cultural
orientations). This is the thrust of Hofstede’s Uncertainty Avoidance dimension. Such
mechanisms can take on various forms, from inhibiting multiple choices to setting fixed
scripts to encouraging deference to seniors and so forth. Schwartz’s model of cultural value
dimensions does not feature a close parallel to Uncertainty Avoidance although low Harmony
is somewhat close to low Uncertainty Avoidance.82
The strategies postulated above operate in opposite directions. The upshot is that
greater complexity of a society’s cultural orientations does not necessarily entail that its
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members will on average exhibit higher levels of need for cognitive closure. Every society
may have a normal distribution of individuals with high and low need for cognitive closure
and average levels could vary in accordance with different cultural profiles.83 Yet the extant
evidence from Chui et al. remains suggestive at this stage. Although we have a fair picture of
the working of the need for closure within cultures, more cross-cultural analysis that employs
careful standardization is warranted.84

D. Values, Cognitive Styles, and Corporate Governance
Corporate governance is the framework that defines the division of power in the
corporation. This division of power in turn determines the division of wealth created by the
corporation. Oftentimes, the regulation of power in the corporation—either of managers or
controlling shareholders—is subsumed under the rubric of “accountability.” For instance, the
OECD Principles of Corporate Governance define the role of the board in terms of
accountability to the company and the shareholders.85 In the context of the maximands of
corporate governance the debate is framed as accountability only to shareholders versus
accountability to multiple constituencies or stakeholders. The latter may be called
“accountees.” In addition to identifying the parties who owe and who are owed

share about 6% of their variance.” Shalom H. Schwartz, Mapping and Interpreting Cultural Differences around
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accountability, a full description of accountability relationships also must specify the content
of the duties it entails.
In social psychology, “[a]ccountability refers to the implicit or explicit expectation of
decision makers that they may be called upon to justify their beliefs, feelings, and actions to
others… [It is] a universal feature of social life that inevitably arises from the normenforcement needs of groups and organizations.”86 Societies establish accountability systems
in order to cope with common problems in group life. Accountability practices are crucial for
establishing social order in that they serve as a feedback mechanism between parties to power
relationships in rule and norm enforcement. In other words, accountability is the “social
psychological link between individual decision makers on the one hand and social systems on
the other.”87 The concept of accountability has deep roots in English traditions.88
Nevertheless, it is now commonly being used as a general term to describe who should bear
responsibility to whom.89
In the Anglo-American legal and political tradition accountability entails promoting
the accountee’s interests, transparency and reporting, and liability to make amends for
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misdeeds.90 American courts thus have used strong language to describe their loathing of
people in fiduciary relationships who derive private benefits from their power position
without making full disclosure to their accountees.91 The precise scope of the accountability
duties owed by corporate fiduciaries may differ from those of other actors in fiduciary
relationships, but the deep suspicion towards transactions that involve conflict of interest is a
dominant feature of American corporate law.92 As part III demonstrates, the entire
stockholder-stakeholder debate revolves around the permissible use of power in the relations
of corporate constituencies. This debate is less about the need to overcome fiduciaries’ selfinterest (over which there is consensus) than about reconciling the conflicting interests of
several constituencies by corporate fiduciaries.
The current theoretical framework highlights the strength with which these basic
issues are tied to psychological and cultural elements. Accountability regimes that define the
division of power and wealth in corporations are determined by a host of factors ranging from
legal rules to court decisions to social norms. Individual corporate decision makers eventually
decide situations that are not directly and exhaustively governed by these social institutions.
None of these factors can sensibly be assumed to be immune to the impact of politics and
culture and, more fundamentally, the psych of the people involved. The aforementioned
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theory and evidence suggest that people tend to behave in consonance with their values.
Pressure to reach decisions rises in tandem with the need for cognitive closure. The pressure
also rises when the situation is vague, when several options need to be weighed against one
another, and when decision makers expect to be held accountable for their decisions. When
under increased pressure to reach a decision, people resort to their shared implicit cultural
knowledge.
The upshot of this reasoning is that accountability mechanisms may look and function
in fundamentally different ways according to the personal characteristics of the people
involved and the to the social environment (country) in which they interact. To get a flavor of
this contextuality, briefly consider the typical Anglo-American version of accountability in
corporate settings, which is explored in more detail below. Through its focus on conflicts of
interest, this accountability style strongly resonates with the Autonomy orientation that
perceives individuals as socially alienated from one another. The Anglo-American
accountability also echoes with Hierarchy in that it presupposes power relationships between
the accountable and the accountee.93 Hence its legitimation of certain economic outcomes of
power differences in the corporation and by curbing others. By narrowing its focus to a single
accountee, this governance norm facilitates the functioning of corporate fiduciaries with
higher levels of need for cognitive closure.
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It follows, however, that managers with lower need for cognitive closure and with
individual value emphases that give greater weight to complex values may feel overly
restrained by such a norm. At the societal level, public opinion in societies that score higher
on Embeddedness or Egalitarianism may consider Anglo-American accountability as antisocial because the latter expresses different views on the proper place of individuals in
society and on proper social structures. Thus, the very notion of “conflict of interest” takes on
a different meaning in a high Embeddedness society, in which the individual self is perceived
as an interdependent entity in a large array of other social members. As a result, basic
institutions from the standard American corporate governance toolkit—e.g., the independent
director—may be incompatible with East Asian corporate governance systems, or at least
produce different outcomes.94 These differences also may have far-reaching implications on
corporate decisions, because managers appear to be very attentive to public opinion.95
Granted, economic incentives to individuals and nations alike also participate in
determining the structure of corporate governance. For instance, financial markets exert
pressure on corporations and decision makers generally to protect the interests of investors of
capital, namely, shareholders and creditors. It would be a mistake, however, to consider
market forces as exogenous. Economic forces and the signals they convey to corporate and
political decision makers through market prices are endogenous to corporate governance.

In this view, the dividing line between the market and the firm is delineated according to the relative
transaction costs entailed be performing a task in each of the former.
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Nevertheless, subject to these restraints, there is ample room for decision makers to take
different actions as long as they can reasonably justify them to themselves and to their
surrounding social environment.
1.

Testable Hypotheses

We are now in a position to generate testable hypotheses about the relations between
values, need for cognitive closure, and corporate governance. Specifically, the foregoing
theoretical discussion suggests several hypotheses concerning the maximands of corporate
governance and the endorsement of shareholder value versus multiple constituency interests
as the maximand. The reasoning behind these hypotheses is simple and follows closely from
the discussion above. Few and relatively straightforward as these hypotheses may be, the
subsequent parts will show that their implications have been hotly debated for decades
without showing signs of reaching resolution.
The first main hypothesis concerns the individual level. In this context, people in
decision-making positions in corporations or involved in policy making are expected
to be more receptive to multiple-constituency corporate governance the more they
emphasize the values of Openness to change versus Conservation and, perhaps more
weakly, values of Self-transcendence versus Self-enhancement. Vice versa for
shareholder value maximization.
A corollary hypothesis is that people’s endorsement of multiple-constituency
corporate governance would decrease the higher is their typical level of need for
cognitive closure.
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Another corollary hypothesis predicts that endorsement of multiple-constituency
corporate governance would correlate positively with liberal political persuasion
whereas endorsement of shareholder-oriented corporate governance would correlate
positively with political conservatism.
The second main hypothesis concerns the societal level. Here it is expected that
societies that put greater emphasis on Embeddedness and Egalitarianism will have
corporate governance systems that are more stakeholder-oriented. The same may be
true for societies high on Harmony. In contrast, societal emphases on Autonomy,
Hierarchy, and Mastery would be accompanied by stronger endorsement of
shareholder value maximization.

E. Some Evidence
Empirical evidence that bears directly on the issues raised here, albeit limited at this
stage, is consistent with the above hypotheses. In this Section, I concentrate the available
evidence. Together with additional evidence, it will be put in more detailed context in
subsequent parts.
Let us again begin at the individual level. A study by Tetlock investigated the
relations between American managers’ political positions and need for cognitive closure on
the one hand and their views on a variety of organizational problems on the other hand.96
Among other things, subjects were presented with scenarios that confronted shareholders’
versus multiple stakeholders’ interests as the goal of corporations. Traditional conservatives
and modern libertarians ranked high on the need for cognitive closure scale and were also
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more favorable to management that endorsed accountability to shareholders only. Lower
scorers on these scales praised management that endorsed the pluralistic regime of
accountability to stakeholders. Follow-up in-depth interviews with participants provided
further support to the quantitative statistical results.97
Analysis at the societal level is based on comparative studies. A well-known survey
by Charles Hampden-Turner and Fons Tropmenaars has found suggestive evidence for
significant relations between culture and stakeholder issues. These researchers surveyed
international managers from several countries and asked them about their attitudes toward
corporate profit. Specifically, managers were asked to choose one of the following as an
accurate statement of the proper goal of a company: “(a) The only real goal of a company is
making profit. (b) A company, besides making profit, has a goal of attaining the well-being of
various stakeholders, such as employees, customers, etc.”98 Four English-speaking countries
ranked highest in endorsing profit-only goal (i.e., shareholder value) among the twelve
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countries represented in this study, with the United States ranking at the top of the list. In
contrast, Germany, France, Singapore, and Japan ranked lowest.99
Lilach Sagiv and Shalom Schwartz have reanalyzed data compiled by HampdenTurner and Tropmenaars on managers’ preferences about solving social dilemmas in
organizations. Specifically, managers who “analyze phenomena into parts (i.e., items, tasks,
numbers, units, points, specifics)” were differentiated from those who “integrate and
configure such details into whole patterns, relationships and wider contexts.”100 As
hypothesized by Sagiv and Schwartz and in line with the above hypothesis on complexity,
managers in nations with cultures that emphasize Harmony tended to choose the integrating
option over the analyzing option for solving social dilemmas.

III. THE AMERICAN DEBATE REVISITED
The most puzzling feature of the stockholder-stakeholder debate is its longevity.
American courts adjudicated the core issue—namely, the supremacy of shareholders’ interest
in the corporation—during the 1910s. The scholarly debate between corporate law giants
Adolf Berle and Merrick Dodd is often said to have been “settled” during the 1930s, arguably
in favor of Dodd’s view. The discord over this issue resurfaced repeatedly, however, as
scholars, courts and legislators continued to address it. At the beginning of the new century,
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exchanges between holders of the two views continue unabated, indeed with greater intensity
than ever before.
This Part provides a new reading of the debate over the maximands of corporate
governance. By critically reviewing the intellectual history of the central positions made in
this debate, this Part will identify the issues over which there is wide consensus and, more
importantly, which issues remain unresolved. This Part will then demonstrate how the
theoretical framework put forward in Part II improves our understanding of this controversy.
Following an analysis of the landmark decision in Dodge v. Ford in Section A, Section B
derives new insights from the details of the Berle-Dodd dialogue. Sections C and D briefly
review the (non)development of the stockholder-stakeholderdebate from the 1950s through
the 1990s. Section E takes a more theory-oriented perspective and reviews the development
of analyses from traditional economic ones, to progressive views, to recent hierarchical
models of the corporation. Section F connects the debate to the theoretical framework in the
preceding Part.

A. Dodge v. Ford
In the summer of 1915, the board of directors of the Ford Motor Company approved a
plan to expand the company’s production capacity to 1,000,000 cars annually. The plan also
called for a reduction in the price per Model T car from $440 to $360 although the market
apparently could sustain the higher price even if for a lower volume. It was further decided
not to distribute as dividends rather huge funds that the company had earned and to invest
them back in the business.101 Mr. Henry Ford, the founder, controlling shareholder, and
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dominant figure in the company, declared that his ambition was “to spread the benefits of this
industrial system to the greatest possible number, to help [people] build up their lives and
homes.”102 In 1919, the Supreme Court of Michigan, in a suit brought by the Dodge brothers
as minority shareholders, clarified that it had “no doubt that certain sentiments, philanthropic
and altruistic, credible to Mr. Ford, had large influence in determining the policy to be
pursued by the Ford Motor Company…”103
The Dodge court was not impressed by these sentiments, however. In what has
become a definitive exposition of shareholders’ status in the corporation for years to come the
court said:
“A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the
stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for that end. The discretion of
directors is to be exercised in the choice of means to attain that end and does not extend to a
change in the end itself, to the reduction of profits or to the nondistribution of profits among
stockholders in order to devote them to other purposes.”104

The proposition, that shareholders are the primary beneficiaries of the corporation and
that, hence, fiduciary duties run to them, in conjunction with the corporation, is now widely
accepted. This proposition is traditionally interpreted as calling on corporate fiduciaries to
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maximize shareholder value.105 It is often referred to by shorthand as the “shareholder
primacy norm” or the “shareholder wealth maximization norm.” While being widely cited
and compelling in its rhetoric, the ruling in Dodge only marks the beginning of the
discussion. It does not reflect current legal doctrines in the U.S. nor does it fully comport
with subsequent theoretical analyses.
Strictly speaking, in terms of the black-letter law concerning the maximands of
corporate governance, only a few courts have read Dodge as saying what countless law
review articles have cited it as saying. In Delaware, both the Supreme Court and the Court of
Chancery cited this case as demonstrating a possible relief to minority shareholders who are
oppressed by the controlling shareholder or management through withholding of
dividends.106 The courts of Michigan, where Dodge originated, also consider Dodge a
standard case of management discretion.107 One Michigan court in fact noted that Dodge was
not a case of action against shareholders’ interests.108
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Doubtless, reading Dodge as a minority rights case would be correct. In a thorough
discussion of Dodge, D. Gordon Smith maintains that this is how the case should be
understood.109 Smith correctly notes that the Dodge court emphasized Henry Ford’s position
as a controlling stockholder in the sentence immediately preceding its statement of the
shareholder primacy norm.110 Yet such reading clearly would also be partial – obscuring
more than revealing. If Dodge had been merely a case of majority-minority relationships in
the corporation it would not have gained the pride of place it has among the seminal
authorities on U.S. corporate law.111
The strength of the ruling in Dodge and the explanation for its longevity both lie in its
being paradigmatic of bona fide conflicts of interest among several corporate constituencies.
There have been a number of more recent episodes in which interests of non-shareholder
constituencies were invoked, e.g., with regard to anti-takeover statutes and court rulings on
anti-takeover defense tactics.112 Yet none of these contexts exhibits the type of dilemma that
Dodge poses with comparable clarity. In the former cases there often exists an overriding
concern about insiders’ self-interest – a lingering suspicion that stakeholders only serve as a
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pretext or camouflage for incumbent managements that want to entrench themselves to the
detriment of public shareholders. Dodge, in contrast, is free of this concern. The court
believed that Henry Ford, in his capacity as the company’s dominant decision maker, was
genuinely motivated by a desire to distribute the fruits of the company’s success to nonshareholder constituencies.

B. The Berle-Dodd Dialogue
Dodge was a legal reflection of its political and economic era. Within a decade,
America would slump into the Great Depression. The level of new car sales that was reached
in the 1920s would be regained only in the late 1950s, after the New Deal and the Second
World War. In the meanwhile, a seminal scholarly exchange had unfolded between two law
professors, Adolf A. Berle of Columbia Law School and E. Merrick Dodd of Harvard Law
School. Like the court’s statements in Dodge, the positions that were articulated in this
dialogue remain definitive and continue to dominate current discussions. Understanding the
original positions in this exchange is key to understanding contemporary positions as well.
The following paragraphs therefore revisit Berle and Dodd with a view to identifying the
historical intellectual roots of the maximands of corporate governance.
Berle fired the opening shot in a 1931 article titled Corporate Powers as Powers in
Trust.113 “It is the thesis of this essay,” Berle stated, “that all powers granted to a corporation
or to the management of a corporation… are necessarily and at all times exercisable only for
the ratable benefit of all the shareholders as their interest appears.”114 At first blush, Berle’s
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claim reads like a restatement of Dodge. Yet it isn’t. Noting that “through the very nature of
the corporate entity, responsibility goes with power,”115 Berle conducted a survey of powers
granted under contemporary law either to corporations or to corporate officers and showed
that all of them are governed by equitable fiduciary duties akin to those that are owed by
trustees toward a cestui que trust.
The central insight and the recurring theme in Berle’s article pertain to the content and
legal nature of the fiduciary duties – not to the identity of the beneficiaries thereof (i.e., the
accountees in the accountability relationship). To be sure, Berle did cite Dodge. But this
decision is brought as supporting authority only to the proposition that the “power to declare
or withhold dividends must be so used as to tend to the benefit not only of the corporation as
a whole but also of all of its shareholders to the extent that this is possible.”116 In other words,
the issue at bar was the relationship between majority and minority shareholders rather than
between shareholders and other constituencies as competing accountees.117
It was actually Dodd who defined the debate over the maximands of corporate
governance as we know it. In his 1932 article For Whom Are Corporate Managers
Trustees?,118 Dodd turned the limelight on the beneficiaries of managers’ duties and away
from the legal nature of these duties, agreeing with Berle on the latter issue, namely, that the
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trusteeship principle should apply to such duties.119 Citing Dodge, Dodd acknowledged that
legal doctrine of his time considered the sole function of the corporation to be the making of
profit for its stockholders such that they are the beneficiaries of the business and the people
who carry it on.120 Dodd nevertheless believed that this situation was undesirable. Writing in
the midst of great economic and social upheaval in America, Dodd appears to have been
deeply moved by the Depression and the budding New Deal.121 In the reformed economy, he
prophesied, there would be “modifications of the maximum-profit-for-the-stockholders-ofthe-individual-company formula.”122
A close reading of Dodd makes it abundantly clear that his prediction, that managers
will come to consider the interests of employees, consumers, and the general public in
addition to stockholder’s interests, was never more than wishful thinking. Support for Dodd’s
belief that the American society was heading in this direction is found in opinions made by a
few prominent figures in the business community of the time.123 Dodd interpreted these
sporadic statements as harbingers of an emerging, more general trend in American society
toward greater concern for non-stockholder constituencies.
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Yet beside Dodd’s unmistaken enthusiasm about these statements, he was quite
inconsistent as to why such trend would likely succeed. Dodd cites the view that taking
employees and consumers into account will increase stockholders’ long-run profits (namely,
efficiency concerns); but he also asserts that managers who have power over the lives of
others will “come to feel as strong a community of interest with their fellow workers as with
a group of investors” (namely, ethical concerns).124 At bottom, the justification for taking
other constituencies into account depends on the recognition of corporations as public
entities, rather than private property of their stockholders. At the same time, such recognition
is a necessary condition for including other constituencies in managers’ considerations.
Just as Dodd never challenged Berle’s original argument, so did Berle, in his response
to Dodd’s article,125 not really dispute the latter’s theoretical position.126 Nevertheless, Berle
literally lashed out at Dodd for making a fallacious move from the normative to the
descriptive. Desirable as it may be as a matter of theory, social responsibility was not in fact
pursued by corporations and corporate insiders. Nor could it be pursued. This implementation
problem, Berle believed, is insurmountable, as there is no mechanism that could enforce
social responsibility on corporations.127
The conclusion, averred Berle, is grim but inevitable:
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“Now I submit that you can not [sic] abandon emphasis on ‘the view that business
corporations exist for the sole purpose of making profits for their shareholders’ until such
time as are to be prepared to offer a clear and reasonably enforceable scheme of
responsibilities to someone else.”128

When Berle was exchanging with Dodd, he was already engulfed in his collaborative
study with Gardiner Means that would yield their seminal book The Modern Corporation and
Private Property.129 In this book, Berle and Means empirically documented the actual
separation between American shareholders’ ownership of corporate stocks on the one hand
and control over Corporate America on the other hand. The result was effective control
residing in the hands of managers, who used it to benefit themselves and controlling
shareholders. Berle and Means called for conceiving corporations as public again. They wrote
that “by surrendering control and responsibility over the active property, [shareholders] have
surrendered the right that the corporation be operated in their sole interest. . . . They have
placed the community in a position to demand that the modern corporation serve not alone
the owners or the control but all society.”130
Berle and Means’ position looks strikingly similar to Dodd’s position, which Berle so
forcefully criticized in his note of the same year. Several commentators have thus been
puzzled by Berle’s position. William Bratton, in an appraisal of The Modern Corporation and
Private Property at the turn of the millenium, points out this apparent inconsistency and

terms of social responsibility. Nor is there any mechanism now in sight enforcing accomplishments of [Dodd’s]
theoretical function.”)
128

Id., at 1367.

129

ADOLPH A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY (rev. ed. 1932).
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writes that “Berle appears to have been of two minds on the matter.”131 Several decades
earlier, Joseph Weiner also argued that Berle was offering contradictory resolutions of the
corporate governance problem and was in fact changing positions on managerial
accountability to shareholders or community.132
Although Bratton is willing to forgive Berle for this inconsistency,133 I would argue
that no such forgiveness is called for, as there is no incoherence in Berle’s writings.134 In
writing his note on Dodd and his book with Means, Berle was fully aware of the need to
protect both stockholders and stakeholders from those in positions of power over their
interests – the constituency that Berle and Means dubbed “control.” The bulk of Berle and
Means’ opus is dedicated to a positive analysis of the separation between ownership and
control in American corporations. Their normative analysis is mostly confined to a small
number of pages in the closing chapter.135 More than seventy years after its publication, this
chapter’s policy analysis remains as fresh and compelling as ever.
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Having established the factual separation of ownership from control and the
concomitant concentration of power in the hands of “control,” Berle and Means set out to
outline different ways in which this power could be regulated in capitalist countries in the
future.136 Two possible ways are the more traditional ones: The first way is to provide legal
protection to public shareholders through the trusteeship model.137 The second way is to give
the groups in control powers which are absolute and not limited by any implied obligation
with respect to the their use.138 Of these two alternatives, the former is said to be the lesser of
two evils.139 Berle and Means did not stop there, however. They point out a third possibility –
the one cited above, under which the “control groups have, rather, cleared the way for the
claims of a groups far wider that either the owners or the control,” to wit, all society.140
Should this “third way” be implemented, Berle and Means claimed, in contrast to the ruling
in Dodge, courts would approve of managerial programs that benefited employees and
communities at the expense of shareholders and bondholders.141
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In contrast with Dodd, however, Berle (writing both alone and with Means) was fully
aware that such a social arrangement would entail formidable implementation problems.
Berle and Means do not hide their preference for this “third way.” Yet they are very careful to
note that it would require specifying the claims of the community “with clarity and force.”
Only “[w]hen a convincing system of community obligations is worked out and is generally
accepted, the passive property rights of today must yield before the larger interests of
society.”142 Until such system is devised, and since effective legal protection of all
stakeholders is infeasible (at least at the time) the law should concentrate on protecting
stockholders through the accountability mechanism of trusteeship.143 The interests of nonstockholder constituencies may receive protection through other means.144
The dialogue between Berle and Dodd largely subsided after 1932 but did not fully
end. In a review of The Modern Corporation and Private Property, Dodd conceded that
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regulation of management conduct would require strong legal measures.145 However, in
another lesser-known article,146 Dodd seems to have tried to deflect Berle’s arguments using
reasoning somewhat similar to Berle’s. Dodd too noted that the major problem for social
regulation of corporate managements had to do with implementation. Legal enforcement
alone, he argued, cannot ensure managements’ loyalty to stockholders if the legal rules are
not in congruence with their professional ethics and, more generally, with socially-approved
goals.147 In this respect, advancing the interests of employees, consumers, and the general
community appeared to Dodd to be “less abnormal” than shareholder value maximization.148
Dodd, however, failed to furnish any new evidence that could support his belief, that
trusteeship for absentee investors “is an ideal that is losing ground in the community
generally.”149
Oddly, twenty years after their dialogue unfolded, Berle stated that events had settled
the argument in Dodd’s favor.
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“Twenty years ago, the writer had a controversy with the late Professor E. Merrick
Dodd, of Harvard Law School, the writer holding that corporate powers were powers in trust
for shareholders while Professor Dodd argued that these powers were held in trust for the
entire community. The argument has been settled (at least for the time being) squarely in
favor of Professor Dodd's contention.”150

The immediate reason that led Berle to concede defeat was the ruling in A.P. Smith
Manufacturing Co. v. Barlow,151 in which a corporate donation to Princeton University was
upheld. However, Berle later clarified that he did not intend to indicate that Dodd was “right
all along.”152 Bearing in mind that the Barlow court cited long-term business interests among
the justifications for the donation to Princeton153—a consideration that is fully in line with
shareholders’ interest—it would seem that Berle was too modest. Berle’s late writings from
the 1950s reflect a conviction that corporations should, as a normative matter, be engaged in
promoting the interests of multiple constituencies.154 At the same time—much like Dodd of
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the 1930s—Berle provided no practical details as to how exactly managers could bring about
this utopian vision. Perhaps he never believed they could.155
Be it as it may, by the mid-1930s, legal doctrine and scholarship in the United States
had developed a sophisticated account of the issues pertaining to the maximands of corporate
governance. The most important achievement of these analyses is their pointing out the core
problem, which is the absence of a coherent system with which the competing interests of
corporate constituencies could be furthered—or at least reconciled—by corporate agents.
This problem continues to haunt corporate governance analysis to this day.

C. From the 1950s to the 1970s
The period from the 1950 through the 1970s witnessed America undergoing several
cycles of renewed interest in corporate social responsibility—the term that was coined to
express promotion of interests of non-shareholder constituencies. These episodes are of lesser
import for the purposes of the present study.156 After World War II and the Korean War, the
United States was the single, unchallenged economic superpower in the world. Large
American corporations were without equal foreign competitors in many markets. This sheer
economic power—concentrated more than ever before in a small number of giant
corporations—has drawn the attention of American commentators. During the 1950s,
journalists, academics, and other critics (including Berle) were musing on the ways to harness

155

Tellingly, Berle titled the fifth chapter of his joint book, supra note 150, Corporate Capitalism and
the City of God.
156

These episodes are described in detail in a recent, skillful account by C.A. Harwell Wells, The
Cycles of Corporate Social Responsibility: An Historical Retrospective for the Twenty-first Century, 51 KAN. L.
REV. 77 (2002), on which the following paragraphs draw.

56

corporate power to socially desirable goals.157 Contemporary contributors identified the
corporation as a problem, yet were unable to propose specific mechanisms to curb its power
or direct it in socially beneficial directions.158 A critical voice came from Yale Law School
Dean Eugene V. Rostow. In what reads like an early version of Jensen’s argument brought in
the beginning of this article, Rostow said:
“The economist has demonstrated with all the apparent precision of plane geometry
and the calculus that the quest for maximum revenue in a competitive market leads to a
system of prices, and an allocation of resources and rewards, superior to any alternative, in its
contribution to the economic welfare of the community as a whole.”159

The 1960s and 1970s brought new reasons for concern with corporate social
responsibility. Attention was paid to a variety of social and political issues, at home and
abroad, including the Vietnam War, civil rights and apartheid, consumer protection, and
environmental issues. With giant corporations perceived as significant players in these issues
(if not outright evil-doers), campaigns were consequently waged for shareholder proposal
reform, public interest directors, and federal corporate chartering.160 These campaigns mostly
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failed or had a negligible lasting effect.161 Indeed, the most memorable voice from that period
is probably Milton Friedman’s in his article The Social Responsibility of Business Is to
Increase Its Profits.162 In this article, Friedman argued against using corporate resources to
promote social goals or moral values in ways not required by law or ethical custom.163
Friedman remained silent about the content and scope of that “ethical custom” which would
legitimate diversion of resources away from maximizing profits. Yet it is clear that such
ethical considerations would be extremely narrow.164
In terms of positive law too, little changed in the direction of eroding shareholder
primacy. Barlow exemplifies a general trend of state legislators to allow corporations to make
charitable contributions but did not seriously challenge shareholder primacy. The famous
1968 decision in Shlensky v. Wrigley,165 upholding the directors’ decision not to install lights
in Wrigley Field despite the loss of potential profits, similarly noted that “the long run
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interests of the corporation in its property value at Wrigley Field might demand all efforts to
keep the neighborhood from deteriorating.”166

D. Other-Constituency Statutes
The controversy over the appropriate maximands of corporate governance erupted in
earnest again during the 1980s. This was largely in consequence to the tidal wave of hostile
takeovers and states’ response in the form of “other constituency statutes.” The title “other
constituency statutes” subsumes a variety of state legislative measures intended to expand the
scope of discretion of public corporations’ managements such that it would include the
interests of non-shareholder constituencies.167 These statutes have engendered numerous legal
commentaries,168 but, fortunately, this sizeable literature need not engage us here for too
long.
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In the late 1970s and early 1980s, corporate charter amendments were adopted by a
few corporations allowing directors, should their corporation become subject to a change of
control, to consider the social and economic effects of the acquisition on the target’s
employees, suppliers, customers, and others.169 The paradigmatic takeover that ostensibly
dominated public perception at the time was the hostile “bust-up” takeover, in which the new
controlling shareholder not only ousts the incumbent management but actually liquidates the
firm’s assets, fires most or all of its employees, and severely disrupts the way of life of small
communities, especially in one-factory towns.170
In 1983, Pennsylvania adopted the first other-constituency statute.171 This statute
served as a model for several other states.172 Today, twenty-nine states have statutes that
permit, or in one instance requires, the directors and officers of corporations chartered within
their states to consider the interests of the standard other constituencies beyond the
corporations’ shareholders, at least in certain situations (particularly in connection with a
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corporation, consider the effects of any action upon employees, suppliers and customers of the
corporation, communities in which offices or other establishments of the corporation are located, and
all other pertinent factors.
Act of Dec. 23, 1983, No. 1983-92, § 1(B), 1983 Pa. Laws 395, cited in Orts, supra note 167, at 27.
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Orts, supra note 167, at 27. For a list of states with other constituency statutes, see Wai Shun
Wilson Leung, The Inadequacy of Shareholder Primacy: A Proposed Corporate Regime that Recognizes Non-
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change of control).173 Delaware never adopted a constituency statute of this type. The
Delaware Supreme Court, in its 1985 decision in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,
nevertheless stated that in analyzing the effect of an imminent takeover on the “corporate
enterprise”, the directors may consider its “impact on constituencies other than shareholders
(i.e., creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps even the community generally)…”174
Courts in other jurisdictions followed suit and approved of considering the interests of other
constituencies.175 The courts did that while emphasizing that such consideration cannot be
made unless benefits to shareholders can be identified, thus echoing earlier decisions
mentioned above.176 In summary, the other constituency statutes are generally interpreted as
having made hardly any change in American corporate law.177

Shareholder Interests, 30 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 587, 613, 620 (1997). For the relevant text of most of the
statutes, see Stetson Symposium, supra note 168, at 279-93.
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See Lynda J. Oswald, Shareholders v. Stakeholders: Evaluating Corporate Constituency Statutes
Under the Takings Clause, 24 IOWA J. CORP. L. 1, 4-6 (1998) (providing a survey of current statues). The
Connecticut statute applies in change-of-control situations, and provides that the directors “shall consider, in
determining what he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation,… the interests of the
corporation's employees, customers, creditors, and suppliers," as well as "community and societal
considerations.” Conn. Gen. Stat. 33-756(d) (2003).
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Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985).
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See GAF Corp. v. Union Carbide Corp., 624 F. Supp. 1016, 1019-20 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (“protection
of loyal employees, including managers, of the organization is not anathema…legitimate concerns for their past
conduct of the enterprise and its requirements need not be left to the goodwill of an unfriendly acquirer of
corporate control in the jungle warfare involving attempted takeovers”); Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal
Foods Corp., 708 F. Supp. 984, 1009, 1015 (E.D. Wis. 1989), aff'd, 877 F.2d 496 (7th Cir. 1989) (same).
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See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986) (the
“board may have regard for various constituencies in discharging its responsibilities, provided that there are
rationally related benefits accruing to the stockholders.”); Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d
1261, 1282, 1285 (Del. 1989) (respectively, the board may consider “the impact of both the bid and the potential
acquisition on other constituencies, provided that it bears some reasonable relationship to general shareholder
interests.”; “an offer [can] be rebuffed, given...the alternatives available and their effect on the various
constituencies, particularly the stockholders.”); see also E. Norman Veasey, Should Corporation Law Inform
Aspirations for Good Corporate Governance Practices - or Vice Versa?, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2179, 2184 (2001)
(“Delaware's jurisprudence holds that the interests of stockholders are primary and may not be trumped by that
of other constituencies, although those interests may be considered if congruent with the interests of the
stockholders.”).
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In 1990, the Committee on Corporate Laws of the Section of Business Law of the American Bar
Association (“ALI-ABA”), as part of the preparation of the Revised Model Business Corporation Act (the
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It has been noted that these statutes have received only cursory attention from the
courts,178 and have played a negligible part, if any, in litigation over directors’ decisions.179
The reason, I argue, is twofold. First, advancing the interests of non-shareholder
constituencies probably never was the primary reason for the enactment of the other
constituency statutes. These statutes should be assessed in light of their typical legislative
history, according to which they were enacted in response to hostile takeovers and were
lobbied for mostly by managements of potential target firms.180 Seen in this light, these
statues belong to a larger arsenal of anti-takeover defenses that were developed and deployed
to help incumbent managements entrench themselves.181 The legal technology for thwarting
management-unfriendly takeovers has progressed since the mid- 1980s such that today it
relies on other means.182 Moreover, once the consideration of other constituencies’ interest

"Model Act"), reviewed the other constituency statutes. The Committee has concluded that the Model Act
should not be amended in light of these statutes. The Committee opined, however, that other constituency
statutes may create “opportunities for misunderstanding and thus pose potential for mischief unless the courts
carefully construe them consistently with existing law.” See ABA Committee on Corporate Laws, Other
Constituencies Statutes: Potential for Confusion, 45 BUS. LAW. 2253, 2254-55, 2257-61 (1990).
178

See Orts, supra note 167, at 23-35 (analyzing court opinions); Oswald, supra note 173, at 7n37

(same).
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See Oswald, supra note 173, at 7 (“Judicial interpretation of the constituency statutes to date has
been sparse and uninformative, invariably referring to the constituency statutes in only a fleeting and tangential
manner. No court has yet provided an analysis of the legality or constitutionality of constituency statutes, or
even an explanation of how they should be implemented in specific contexts.”)
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Orts, supra note 167, at 24. For instance, the Pennsylvania statute was enacted at the behest of the
state Chamber of Commerce at a time when two local companies, Scott Paper Company and Gulf Oil, were
facing control battles. Orts, id. Orts notes, however, that a few statutes were also backed by labor unions – a
fact that underscores their consistency with employees’ interest. This point should distract one from the
argument made in the text. The language of these statues – in principle and perhaps also in practice – benefits
employees. Yet the motivation for their enactment came from managements.
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See Thomas W. Dunfee, Challenges to Corporate Governance: Corporate Governance in a Market
with Morality, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 129, 136 (1999) (arguing that this heritage of other constituency
statutes taints their status as legitimizing a multi-stakeholder approach to corporate governance.)
182

A general discussion of anti-takeover techniques is beyond the scope of the present study. For a
review and analysis, see, e.g., John C. Coates IV, Explaining Variation in Takeover Defenses: Blame the
Lawyers, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1301 (2001); see also Lucian Arye Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV, & Guhan
Subramanian, The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN.
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was brought within the ambit of legitimate managerial discretion—namely, within the ambit
of the business judgment rule—chances became slim that parties would litigate over such
consideration, similar to other “just say no” anti-takeover defenses.183
The second explanation for the low impact that the other constituency statutes have
had on American corporate law brings us back to the subject of this paper. Beyond merely
mentioning the interests of the regular constituencies—often with the reservation that they
should be in line with long-term shareholder interests—these statutes did not provide much
guidance as to how these apparently conflicting interests should be reconciled. When could
employees’ interests take precedence over shareholders’ interests? Must the benefit accruing
to employees be larger than the loss visited on shareholders? How should this calculus be
done – per constituency, per capita, per relative investment? Stated otherwise, these statutes
raised the very implementation problem that Berle was so keenly aware of – the problem that
caused him to abandon his City-of-God principle184 of managers’ trusteeship to multiple
stakeholder for a second-best duty to shareholders. To use Berle and Means’ words, what was
(and remains) lacking is a “convincing system of community obligations” that is framed

L. REV. 887 (2002); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV, & Guhan Subramanian, The Powerful
Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Further Findings and a Reply to Symposium Participants, 55 STAN. L.
REV. 885 (2002).
183

For a retrospective review of the take-over wave and anti-takeover defenses (particularly the poison
pill), see Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Pill: Adaptive
Responses to Takeover Law, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 871, 873-88 (2002); see also Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case
Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 973, 1021-26 (2002).
184

See supra note 155.
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“with clarity and force.”185 Neither the courts nor academic commentators have succeeded in
devising such a system.186

E. Contemporary Analyses and Their Limits
The debate over other constituency statutes in the late 1980s and early 1990s also
rekindled the more general discussion on the maximands of corporate governance and the
appropriate beneficiaries of managers’ fiduciary duties. This Section maps these approaches
and identifies their relative strengths and weaknesses.
1.

Traditional Economic Analysis

The traditional law and economics approach to the maximands issue holds, simply,
that the shareholder-value-maximization rule is (1) efficient and (2) workable. Respectively,
a multiple-constituency rule is said to be inefficient and unworkable. This line of analysis is
represented in its the purest form by Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel’s 1991 book
summarizing their work on corporate law.187 In line with their general contractual view of the
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See supra text to note 142.
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The final version of the ALI’s Principles of Corporate Governance similarly reflects the vague rule
that directors are allowed to consider the interests of non-shareholder constituencies. The general rule provides
that “a corporation...should have as its objective the conduct of business activities with a view to enhancing
corporate profit and shareholder gain.” AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.01(a) (1994). Nevertheless, corporations may pursue non-profitenhancing objectives in three conditions: (1) such action is required for staying within the boundaries of the law;
(2) such action is taken in light of ethical considerations appropriate to responsible conduct of business; (3) a
reasonable amount of resources may be dedicated to charitable causes. Id. § 2.01(b). The Principles also include
a rule covering the specific context of corporate behavior in the face of a hostile takeover bit, id., at § 6.02,
which reflects the case law described above. That these Principles are vague and leave ample room for reaching
different decisions can hardly be denied. Section 2.01(b)(2) in particular imports into corporate decision-making
processes a host of potential considerations that are bound to be controversial and subject to political
inclinations.
187

EASTERBOROOK & FISCHEL¸ supra note 4.
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corporation,188 Easterbrook and Fischel also address the issue of the maximands of corporate
governance. The pivotal element in this analysis is the notion of “residual claimant,” namely,
the party (constituency) who is entitled to derive benefits from an enterprise only after all
other claims have been satisfied. Easterbrook and Fischel equate this constituency with
shareholders. Shareholders are the only constituency whose interest is risky and is determined
ex post factum. All other constituencies—including creditors and employees—have fixed
claims whose value is known in advance, at least in expectancy, or no (valid) claim at all.189
Under this analysis, shareholder wealth maximization is the desirable rule because it
takes advantage of the firm’s strength due to its tendency to maximize wealth in general.
Easterbrook and Fischel set aside other social goals such as addressing pollution, bribery, and
plant closing, for two reasons:
“One reason is obvious: a manager told to serve two masters (a little for the equity
holders, a little for the community) has been freed of both and is answerable to neither…
Agency costs rise and social wealth falls.
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The view of the corporation as a contractual arrangement—or a “nexus of contracts”—raises prickly
questions that are beside the goal of this paper. The nexus metaphor is attributed to Michael C. Jensen &
William H. Meckling, Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305
(1976) and Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization,
62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972). For a critical analysis, see Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Conception that the
Corporation is a Nexus of Contracts, 24 IOWA J. CORP. L. 819 (1999); see also Jeffrey Nesteruk, Persons,
Property, and the Corporation, 39 DEPAUL L. REv. 543 (1990); William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic
Conception of the Business Corporation, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 261 (1992).
189

EASTERBOROOK & FISCHEL¸ supra note 4, at 36 (“For most firms the expectation is that the residual
risk bearers have contracted for a promise to maximize long-run profits of the firm, which in turn maximizes the
value of their stock. Other participants contract for fixed payouts—monthly interest, salaries, pensions,
severance payments, and the like… Risk bearers get a residual claim to profit; those who do not bear risk on the
margin get fixed terms of trade.”)
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Another reason is no less important but more often missed: maximizing profits for
equity investors assists the other “constituencies” automatically… In a market economy each
party to a transaction is better off.”190

Thus, the justifications for determining shareholders’ interest as the single maximand
of corporate governance are both theoretical and practical. The shareholder-wealthmaximization rule arguably increases social wealth and is therefore efficient in comparison to
the alternative rule that decreases wealth. This is the traditional argument of the rising-tidelifts-all-boats type—an alleged “win-win situation.”191 It explicitly ignores other social
issues. Indeed, Easterbrook and Fischel deny that such issues have to do with corporate
governance.192 Other scholars have joined Easterbrook and Fischel’s camp of those endorsing
shareholder value as the proper maximand relying on a variety of arguments.193 What is
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Id., at 38.
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For similar articulations of this argument see Mark J. Roe, The Shareholder Wealth Maximization
Norm and Industrial Organization, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2063, 2065 (2001) (“The utilitarian justification [for the
shareholder wealth maximization norm] is that… in the long run, the argument goes, employees and other
stakeholders are overall better off with fluid and efficient capital markets, managers need a simple metric to
follow, and both wealth and, in the end, fairness are maximized by shareholders being the corporation's residual
beneficiary, with the other claimants getting what they want via contract with the corporation.”); Allen, supra
note 188, at 269-70 (same).
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Id., at 39 (“To view pollution, or investment in South Africa, or other difficult moral and social
questions as governance is to miss the point”) (emphasis in the original). Many commentators may object to this
classification of issues as related or unrelated to corporate governance. Scholars from the progressive corporate
law movement, mentioned in the text below, surely would make such objections. However, writers not
identified with this group also include a broader set of issues in “corporate governance.” See, e.g., Dyck &
Zingales, supra note 95 (discussing the role of the media in pressuring corporate managers and directors to
behave in ways that are “socially acceptable”, mostly with regard to environmental issues, and sometimes not in
line with shareholders’ value maximization.)
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See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Metapolitics and Corporate Law Reform, 36 STAN. L. REV. 923 (1984);
Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for Making Shareholders the Exclusive
Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 23 (1991); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P.
Miller, Corporate Stakeholders: A Contractual Perspective, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 401 (1993); Stephen M.
Bainbridge, In Defense of Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm: A Reply to Professor Green, 50 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1423 (1993); Mark E. Van Der Weide, Against Fiduciary Duties to Corporate Stakeholders, 21
DEL. J. CORP. L. 27 (1996); Lynda J. Oswald, Shareholders v. Stakeholders: Evaluating Corporate
Constituency Statutes Under the Takings Clause, 24 IOWA J. CORP. L. 1 (1998); Alan J. Meese, The Team
Production Theory Of Corporate Law: A Critical Assessment, 43 WILLIAM & MARY L. REV. 1629 (2002).
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common to this group is the assumption that shareholder primacy leads to efficient outcomes
because it requires corporate decision makers to maximize the corporate residual claim and,
consequently, the entire corporate pie and general social welfare.
The practical reason for preferring shareholder value as a unique maximand is that
this is a workable rule, or, more accurately, that the alternative multiple-constituency rule
would be unworkable. As economist Oliver Hart has put it, calling on management to take
the interests of all constituencies into account “is essentially vacuous, because it allows
management to justify almost any action on the grounds that it benefits some group.”194
2.

Incomplete Contracts and Power

The traditional economic analysis case for shareholder primacy as it is described
above is susceptible to a number of criticisms. These criticisms challenge different aspects of
the traditional case but on the whole they tend to undermine the claim that shareholder
primacy is an efficient rule. The central critique of this claim attacks the pivotal distinction
between fixed and residual claims on the corporation. Consider the corporation’s creditors. In
theory, no claim on the firm can be more fixed then those stipulated in a loan agreement, a
debenture, and the like. Courts have indeed underscored the fact, that bondholder protection
is determined only by the language of the indenture. Bondholders were thus denied any
further vague and open-ended protection under a duty of loyalty paradigm.195 In light of this
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Oliver Hart, An Economist's View of Fiduciary Duties, 43 U. TORONTO. L.J. 299, 303 (1993).
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See Simons v. Cogan 542 A. 2d 785, 785-791 (1987) (hereinafter Simons); see also William B.
Bratton, The Economics and Jurisprudence of Convertible Bonds, 1984 WISC. L. REV. 667, 668 (1984) (“Courts
traditionally have directed bondholders to protect themselves against… self-interested issuer action with explicit
contractual provisions. Holders of senior securities, such as bonds, are outside the legal model of the firm for
protective purposes: a heavy black-letter line bars the extension of corporate fiduciary protections to them.”)
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legal situation it is no wonder that the legal profession has perfected the art of indenture
drafting and developed a comprehensive set of contractual covenants intended to protect
creditors in various contingencies.196
This seeming perfectness is misleading, however. Developments in the economic
theory of contracts especially since the late 1980s have highlighted the problem of
incomplete contracts.197 In contrast to what some scholars and courts may have believed in
the past, commercial relationships between corporations and their creditors can never be
“exhaustively documented” in a contract.198 The complete contingent contract—namely, the
contract that defines the parties’ rights and entitlements in every future contingency—is
impossible to achieve.
In reality, parties are unable to foresee all future states of the world such that surprises
are bound to occur. Even if all future contingencies were foreseeable the cost of spelling them
out, negotiating for an agreed outcome, and putting down the agreement in writing would be
prohibitive. At times, a party may even wish to exploit an informational advantage it has over
the other party if it would not be actionable in court and abstain from pointing out certain
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The Simons court, at 542 A. 2d 791, thus referred to the “highly negotiated and exhaustively
documented commercial relationship between an issuer of convertible securities and the holders of such
securities”. For a classic survey, see Clifford W. Smith & Jerold B. Warner, On Financial Contracting: An
Analysis of Bond Covenants 17 J. FIN. ECON. 117 (1979).
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See, generally, OLIVER HART, CONTRACTS AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE (1995); for further economic
analyses, see Sharon Gifford, Limited Attention and the Optimal Incompleteness of Contracts, 15 J. L. ECON. &
ORG. 468 (1999); Kathryn E. Spier, Incomplete Contracts and Signaling, 23 RAND J. ECON. 432 (1992);
Jonathan Thomas & Tim Worrall, Income Fluctuations and Asymmetric Information, 51 J. ECON.THEORY 367
(1991); Douglas B. Bernheim & Michael Whinston, Incomplete Contracts and Strategic Ambiguity, 88 AM.
ECON. REV. 432 (1998); Oliver Hart & John Moore, Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation, 56
ECONOMETRICA 755 (1988); Oliver Hart, Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm, 4 J. L. ECON. &
ORG. 119 (1988); Gur Huberman & Charles M. Kahn, Limited Contract Enforcement and Strategic
Renegotiation, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 471 (1988).
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Cf. the court’s statement in Simons, supra note 196.
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contingencies. Parties may fail to contract on certain contingencies if such contracting would
be futile. Such will be the case when it is impossible or prohibitively costly to monitor the
other party (the problem of unobservability); or, even when a breach could be detected, the
injured party would be unable to prove it to a third party, e.g., a judge (the problem of
unverifiability).
These aspects of incomplete contracts link the issue of corporate governance
maximands to the agency problem. The myriad reasons for impossibility of complete
contingent contracts suggest that in many cases, the rights and entitlements of the parties
would be indeterminate. Situations in which one party (the agent) has the ability unilaterally
to affect the interest of the other party (the principal) are likely to be ubiquitous. One may say
that in such situations the former has power over the latter in the Hohfeldian meaning of this
term.199
Let us now return to the corporation’s creditors. The logic behind the Simons doctrine,
under which creditors are protected only by contractual covenants, holds when the firm is
solvent and the parties can assess, and price, the likelihood of default. As the firm nears
financial distress, shareholders—as the beneficiaries of corporate officers’ fiduciary duties—
have an interest that the firm will take excessive risk. Should the contingency of business
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In the 1910s, Wesley Hohfeld advanced an elegant diagrammatic model of dyadic relationships
between legal statuses that included a dyadic relationship between power and liability. Wesley N. Hohfeld,
Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913) (hereinafter
Hohfeld 1913); Wesley N. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26
YALE L.J. 710 (1917). According to Hohfeld, “[the] person (or persons) whose volitional control is paramount
may be said to have the (legal) power to affect the particular change of legal relations that is involved in the
problem.” Hohfeld 1913, id., at 44. Liability is simply a correlative concept of power, denoting the status of the
other party as subject to the first party’s power. Hohfeld later consolidated his model in WESLEY N. HOHFELD,
FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING, (W.W. Cook, ed. 1919; reprint
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failure materialize the loss will be visited on the creditors; but shareholders will reap all the
gains (net of financing costs) should the firm succeed. One can therefore say that in such
cases, shareholders have power vis-à-vis creditors.
Acknowledging the nature of this relationship as one of power, the courts of Delaware
voiced guarded willingness to recognize an exception to the Simons doctrine. In Credit
Lyonnais,200 Chancellor Allen stated in an obiter dictum that when a corporation is in severe
financial distress, corporate fiduciaries owe their fiduciary obligation to the “corporate
enterprise” rather than to shareholders or any single constituency. “At least where a
corporation is operating in the vicinity of insolvency, a board of directors is not merely the
agent of the residue [sic] risk bearers, but owes its duty to the corporate enterprise.”201 In a
situation like this, management may need to harm shareholder value by accepting fire-sale
prices for corporate assets.202 This is because the “board or its executive committee [has] an
obligation to the community of interest that sustained the corporation.”203
Credit Lyonnais and its progeny204 thus go explicitly against the traditional economic
analysis injunction, that shareholder value, as it reflects the residual claim on the corporation,

1964). For a general analysis of Hohfled’s framework, see ANDREW HALPIN, RIGHTS AND LAW: ANALYSIS AND
THEORY (1997).
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Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp., No. CIV.A.12150, 1991
WL 277613, at 34 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991); reprinted in William Allen, Unreported Case: Credit Lyonnais
Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp., 17 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1099 (1992).
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Credit Lyonnais, 1991 WL 277613 at 33.
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Id.
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Id.
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In a later decision Chancellor Allen clarified the ruling in Credit Lyonnais while repeating the
reference to multiple constituencies. See Equity-Linked Investors, L.P. v. Adams, 705 A.2d 1040, 1042 n. 2
(Del. Ch. 1997) (“where foreseeable financial effects of a board decision may importantly fall upon creditors as
well as holders of common stock, as where [the] corporation is in the vicinity of insolvency, an independent
board may consider impacts upon all corporate constituencies in exercising its good faith business judgment for
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should be the single appropriate maximand. When the indeterminacy of entitlements in the
firm cannot be avoided, e.g., during severe financial distress, corporate decision makers205 are
called to consider the interest of a nebulous “corporate enterprise” and give regard to its
multiple constituencies.206
Like earlier calls for multiple-constituency fiduciary duties, the Credit Lyonnais
doctrine is susceptible to the critique that it is unworkable as it immediately raises the
implementation problem identified by Berle. Once the residual-claim yardstick is rejected,
corporate decision makers are left with no clear beacon with which they can navigate
corporate affairs. Echoing Easterbrook and Fischel, Victor Brudney thus criticizes this line of
court rulings, because the current board structure makes “the same persons arbiters for
conflicting interests with accountability to none.”207 Brudney indeed opines that “it is hard to

the benefit of the 'corporation.'”); see also Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Buckhead Am. Corp. v.
Reliance Capital Group, Inc. (in re: Buckhead Am. Corp.) 178 B.R. 956, 968 (D. Del. 1994) (board of directors
of corporations operating in vicinity of insolvency owes duty to corporate enterprise); Miramar Resources, Inc.
v. Schultz (In re Schultz), 208 B.R. 723, 729 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1997) (same; applying the Credit Lyonnais
decision).
205

One may note anecdotally that somewhat like the situation in Dodge, in Credit Lyonnais these
decision makers included both the majority shareholder and the board of directors.
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The “corporate enterprise” thus denotes something different, and arguably broader, than the firm
itself as a legal personality. Readers should therefore not be misled by the fact that corporate fiduciaries are
commonly said to owe their duties to the corporation. See, e.g., Guth v. Loft, Inc., Del. Supr., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5
A.2d 503, 510 (1939). The real issue is which maximand fiduciaries should choose in fulfilling their obligations
toward the corporation.
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Victor Brudney, Contract and Fiduciary Duty in Corporate Law, 38 B.C. L. REV 595, 645-46
(1997). Brudney, id., thus proposes a reformed governance structure for properly considering the conflicting
interests of all the constituencies involved:
“[I]t may be necessary and appropriate for the corporate decision-making body (the board and
management) to reconcile the interests of the competing claims of stockholders and creditors (and other
stakeholders) in maximizing the enterprise's value. If so, that body should by law (1) be so instructed, and
furnished with appropriate criteria for decision, and (2) be constituted of appropriately weighted representatives
of each class of claimants.”
Note the similarity between Brudney’s requirement (1) and Berle’s requirement for “a system of
community obligations” that is framed “with clarity and force.”
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see why directors should become [creditors’] fiduciaries, and it is impossible to see how
directors can at one time be fiduciaries for both (or all) constituencies.”208 209
The conflict of interest between shareholders and creditors is only a specific case that
exemplifies the multiple constituency problem. In fact, the constituencies of shareholders and
creditors have more in common with one another than most other constituencies since both of
them provide capital to the firm. As a result, the relationships between these constituencies
are less likely to invoke more general political controversies. The foregoing discussion
therefore provides a good example for the general problem.
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Id., at 645 n. 128.
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The situation may change materially when the firm is no longer “in the vicinity of insolvency” but is
actually insolvent, even if formal bankruptcy proceedings were not initiated. At that point, creditors legally are
the residual claimholders such that fiduciary duties should run to them. See, e.g., Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v.
Sea Pines Co., 692 F.2d 973, 976 (4th Cir. 1982); Geyer v. Ingersoll Publications Co., 621 A.2d 784, 787-90
(Del. Ch. 1992) (acknowledging fiduciary duties to creditors); Brandt v. Hicks, Muse & Co. (In re Healthco
Int'l, Inc.), 208 B.R. 288, 300 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1997) (directors owe fiduciary duties to creditors when a
transaction leaves the corporation insolvent or with unreasonably small capital); Odyssey Partners v. Fleming
Cos., 735 A.2d 386, 420 (Del. Ch. 1999) (the board of an insolvent corporation was under a duty to balance the
effect of corporate action on “shareholders, creditors and other corporate constituencies”).
Note, however, that even insolvent corporations, who are in bankruptcy proceedings, may face the
problem of multiple constituencies. There, the amalgam of constituencies that constitutes the corporate
enterprise under Credit Lyonnais is replaced with a similar amalgam, which is the estate. See LaSalle Nat'l Bank
v. Perelman, 82 F. Supp. 2d 279, 292 (D. Del. 2000) (officers and directors of an insolvent corporation have a
"fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the estate as a whole, including its creditors, equity interest holders
and other parties in interest"). For an analysis, see Lynn M. Lopucki, The Nature of the Bankrupt Firm: A Reply
to Baird and Rasmussen's 'The End of Bankruptcy’, 56 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2003) (arguing that no
single class of residual owners exists in most bankrupt firms); Jesse M. Fried & Alon Chaver, Managers’
Fiduciary Duty Upon the Firm's Insolvency: Accounting for Performance Creditors, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1813
(2002) (arguing that an insolvent firm is likely to have two types of creditors such the duty to maximize the
value of only one category may be inefficient); Jonathan Lipson, Directors’ Duties to Creditors: Volition,
Cognition, Exit and the Financially Distressed Corporation, 50 UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming 2003) (arguing
that fiduciary duties of distressed corporations should shift only toward relatively weaker creditors, who lack
volition, cognition, and exit). For additional analyses of the relationships between shareholders and creditors as
corporate constituencies, see Ann E. Conway Stilson, Reexamining the Fiduciary Paradigm at Corporate
Insolvency and Dissolution: Defining Directors' Duties to Creditors, 20 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (1995); Laura Lin,
Shift of Fiduciary Duty Upon Corporate Insolvency: Proper Scope of Directors' Duty to Creditors, 46 VAND. L.
REV. 1485 (1993); Gregory V. Varallo & Jesse A. Finkelstein, Fiduciary Obligations of Directors of the
Financially Troubled Company, 48 BUS. LAW. 239 (1992); Zipora Cohen, Directors' Negligence Liability to
Creditors: A Comparative and Critical View, 26 IOWA J. CORP. L. 351 (2001).
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Similar problems can be found between shareholders and other constituencies.210
Employees in particular have been said to suffer from setting shareholder value as the unique
corporate governance maximand. Many (though not all) employees make considerable
investment in firm-specific human capital—namely, skills and knowledge that cannot easily
be utilized if the worker moved to a different employer or were left without a job. Workers
may not be fully compensated for this investment through their salaries or wages before some
unforeseen contingency materializes that threatens their employment.211 In other words,
employees are exposed to the power of corporate decision makers and, in consequence, to the
power of shareholders.
3.

The Progressive View

As noted above, American legislators and courts, primarily in the context of other
constituency statutes,212 have opened the door for considering the interest of employees by
corporate decision makers. Yet they have provided no guidance as to how such consideration
could be implemented. Similarly, legal scholars have called for recognizing fiduciary duties
to corporate employees especially during financial distress.213 Many of these calls are part of
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See Marleen A. O'Connor, Restructuring the Corporation's Nexus of Contracts: Recognizing a
Fiduciary Duty to Protect Displaced Workers, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1189 (1991) (arguing that directors should owe
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the Progressive Corporate Law movement whose members advocate using and, to the extent
necessary, also reforming corporate law in order to promote the interests of non-shareholder
constituencies: employees, local communities, the environment.214
The Progressive Corporate Law movement is ideologically associated with the
communitarian movement headed by Amitai Etzioni and can roughly be characterized as of
left-of-center persuasion.215 The communitarian view argues for the ability to choose
different rules for different situations in corporate law216 and for discharging fiduciary duties
toward various constituencies on a case-by- case, situation-specific basis.217 That this would
create uncertainty is readily admitted by these scholars and is actually seen as an
advantage.218 The progressive left-wing political characterization of this group contrasts
advocates of multiple-constituency corporate governance with some prominent advocates of
adhering to shareholder value as a unique maximand, who self-label as political

and Justice: Rethinking the Stakeholder Debate, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 475 (1993); Alan Hyde, Ownership,
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conservatives.219 To the latter, as we have seen, the need to address multiple interests under
uncertainty renders multiple-constituency corporate governance unworkable.220
4.

Hierarchical Models

The journey through the intellectual history of the stockholder-stakeholder debate in
the United States would not be complete without noting two interesting recent contributions.
Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout have offered a new view on the role of directors in public
corporations.221 Blair and Stout propose to adopt a view of the corporation as a team to which
different constituencies—shareholder, creditors, employees, managers, and communities—
contribute and from which they expect certain returns. Because contracting among
constituencies cannot be complete constituencies constantly have competing claims and each
constituency may be exposed to the opportunistic power of other constituencies.222 The
public corporation, it is argued, is better viewed as a “mediating hierarchy” in which the
directors are the “mediating hierarchs.” The board enjoys ultimate decisionmaking authority
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Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1737 (2001) (hereinafter Behavioral
Foundations); see also Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Director Accountability and the Mediating Role of
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- Bad Arguments For Shareholder Primacy, 75 SO. CAL. L. REV. 1189 (2002); Lynn A. Stout, On the
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Board) (Working paper 2003), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=389407.
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to determine the use of corporate assets and to reconcile all the conflicting interests and
disputes that may arise among corporate constituencies.223
Like any other theory of corporate governance, the mediating hierarch model needs to
address two different questions: first, what prevents such powerful hierarchs from using their
power to their own personal benefit, and second, how should these hierarchs exercise their
power to reconcile conflicts of interest among constituencies. Blair and Stout propose an
answer to the first question but eschew the second question altogether.
In regards with the problem of curbing managerial opportunism (which is largely
beside the focus of this study) Blair and Stout marshal a large body of behavioral research
that has looked at people’s behavior in social dilemma games. In such games subjects have to
weigh their self-interest, usually expressed in some monetary payoff, against the interest of
other players. It is now well established that in seeming contradiction to predictions of neoclassical economic theory, subjects quite often behave in ways that appear altruistic: They
would sacrifice self-reward to achieve an outcome that benefits others, or in ways that appear
compatible with an abstract ethical principle (e.g., fairness).224 225
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Compelling as it may be, the evidence from behavioral economics is unhelpful in
resolving the problem of multiple constituencies’ interests. This body of evidence may be
relevant primarily to situations that involve conflict of interest between managers and the
corporation or beneficiaries of the corporation. In other words, this evidence may shed light
on the type of agency problem, which is relatively less controversial. To the extent that the
experimental results carry over to real-life situations, they may mitigate concerns about
managerial opportunism. With regard to the conflict of interest among constituencies, Blair
and Stout’s approach suggests that directors should not be under direct control of either
shareholders or other stakeholders, although they believe that shareholders would benefit
from granting directors discretion to favor other constituencies.226
Stephen Bainbridge has advanced a “director primacy” theory that shares major
features with Blair and Stout’s mediating hierarch model.227 Drawing on early work by
Kenneth Arrow on governance in institutions, Bainbridge argues that authority rather than
consensus should be the governance mechanism in corporations and that the directors are the

these factors are sufficient for preventing managerial opportunism in extreme settings like a hostile takeover bid
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proper locus of authority.228 The board of directors is portrayed not as an agent for the
shareholders but rather as “a sort of Platonic guardian serving as the nexus of the various
contracts that make up the corporation.”229 Unlike Blair and Stout, Bainbridge holds to the
view that shareholder value should be the sole maximand of corporate governance.230 Similar
to the claim in traditional economic analysis, the fear is that requiring directors to make tradeoffs between shareholder and stakeholder interests would prove unworkable.231

F. A New Look at the Old Debate
The standard reading of the stockholder-stakeholder debate used to be couched in
terms of desirability—that is, whether corporate fiduciaries should be accountable to nonshareholder constituencies. As we have seen, modern economic theory teaches that simple
economic analysis cannot resolve this question. This Part has shown that below the surface of
the question of desirability there lies a more fundamental problem of feasibility – whether
corporate fiduciaries can, systematically, be held accountable to multiple non-shareholder
constituencies. Berle was the first to identify this problem as the factor that should determine
legal policy. Berle strongly believed that accountability to multiple constituencies is desirable

“at the apex of which sits"a board of directors whose authority over the use of corporate assets is virtually
absolute.”) (citing Blair & Stout, Team Production, supra note 221, at 251).
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Bainbridge, Nexus of Contracts, id., at 20 (citing KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF
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but could not think of a way to implement it. He therefore advocated accountability only to
shareholders as a distant second best in order to at least mitigate the adverse effects of
insiders’ self-interest.
Modern economic theory vindicates Berle’s position. This theory also highlights the
gravity of the implementation problem in formalizing the notion that the corporation is not a
nexus of contracts but rather a nexus of power relationships governed only partially by the
law. The interests of various corporate constituencies are inherently indeterminate and,
consequently, may be inherently conflicting. The recent contributions by Blair and Stout and
by Bainbridge continue the old divide between stakeholderists and stockholderists. These
authors explicate the fact that corporate decision makers have both the duty and power to
reconcile conflicting interests on a constant basis. Notwithstanding the similarity of their
basic frameworks, these authors, like many before them, disagree on whether American
managers can be trusted to successfully deal with situations that involve multiple
considerations, ambiguity and uncertainty.
The theory of values and cognitive style put forward in Part II casts the stockholderstakeholder debate in a new light that exposes its roots. The polar views in this debate reflect
different assumptions about the psychology of American mangers and the American culture.
The position that shareholder value should be the only maximand of corporate governance
reflects a belief that, on average, American managers would find it difficult to function under
a multiple constituency accountability regime and are likely to take advantage of the situation
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to benefit themselves. Proponents of multiple constituency accountability appear to believe
that the personal qualities of the average American manager enable her to manage complex
situations to the benefit of all corporate constituencies even without a clear roadmap.
The present theory allows one to move from general assertions of the sort just made to
a more rigorous framework that allows for empirical testing. Thus, the debate should be
analyzed as a controversy over the values and need for cognitive closure of American
managers and other decision makers. The single shareholder-value-maximand position is
consistent with the view that managers emphasize values of Conservation and Selfenhancement more than values of Openness to change and Self-transcendence. In accordance
with the emphasis on Conservation, the single maximand position also implies that managers’
average level of need for cognitive closure may be too high to enable them simultaneously to
consider the interests of multiple constituencies and cope with the confusion they entail. The
opposite holds for the multiple maximands position: Emphasis on Openness to change and
Self-transcendence and low need for cognitive closure that accommodates handling multiple
considerations under uncertainty on an ad hoc basis.
As we have seen, Tetlock’s study of American managers provides evidence in support
of this analysis.232 Tetlock uses political positions to conceptualize and operationalize values
at the individual level. In this analysis, political conservatism and libertarianism are
contrasted with liberalism in supporting a single versus multiple maximands corporate
governance, respectively. The Schwartz model of individual values offers a superior
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analytical framework for discussing value-related issues, especially in comparative contexts,
and should yield equivalent results.
The value dimension framework also allows for identifying gaps in existing
theoretical accounts. In the main, most theorists have focused on managerial self-interest.
This aspect is related primarily to the Self-enhancement/Self-transcendence dimension. Little
elaboration if any has been offered in regards to the reconciliation of conflicting interests of
third parties by managers. Scholars either assume that this task is feasible or that it is not,
without elaborating on factors that may affect managers’ ability to cope with this
implementation problem. By relating this aspect to the Openness to change/Conservation
dimension, this paper points to the direction in which further research should continue.233
The foregoing analysis leads to an interesting conclusion about the future of the
stockholder-stakeholder debate. It also provides an important lesson for policy makers. In
brief, this debate is unlikely ever to be resolved. People’s positions in this debate appear to be
rooted deep in their individual value preferences and cognitive style. The American society,
like every other society, has a wide distribution of individual traits, including value
preferences and cognitive styles. The insight that multiple considerations and ambiguity are
inherent to managing corporate affairs entails that people will always differ on how best to
cope with this task.
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Even the more sophisticated accounts, such as Blair and Stout’s theory of the board a mediating
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Do these insights imply the desirability of legal reform in the United States
(specifically, a reform in the direction advocated by stakeholderists)? It appears not. Since the
board of directors is the ultimate holder and arbiter of power in the corporation, the question
essentially boils down to the one debated by Berle and Dodd, to wit, “To whom are corporate
directors trustees?” Once the American jurisprudence had defined the relations between
corporate officers and corporate constituencies (and the corporation itself) as relations that
rest on power differences, an accountability-based legal regime was the natural response
given the legal roots of American corporate law in common law and equity principles. Such a
regime precludes loyalty to multiple beneficiaries almost by definition, irrespective of the
danger of managerial opportunism. A legal reform that required directors to discharge their
fiduciary duties simultaneously to multiple constituencies thus would resemble trying to fit a
square peg into a round hole. It would not matter, for that purpose, whether one classified
such multiple-beneficiary duties in the duty of loyalty or the duty of care rubrics.
By uncovering the psychological roots of the stockholder-stakeholder debate, this
article implies that legal reform—no matter how well intentioned it may be—is unlikely to
eradicate the consequences of the balance struck by American legislators and courts, that
focuses primarily on shareholders’ interests. The current legal environment apparently is one
in which more managers can function given their level of need for cognitive closure. A legal
regime that imposes a lower cognitive load allows a wider range of managers to discharge
their duties effectively, as it accommodates those managers who are higher on the need for
closure. Managers with a lower need for closure can still function under a single-maximand
regime. Yet by not equally catering to the interests of non-shareholder constituencies, the
current regime may be leading to sub-optimal management of firms, as several management
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scholars argue.234 What may look to some as unnecessary social loss, however, may actually
be a social optimum once the constraint of cognitive style is taken into account.
If the present hypotheses are correct—namely, that a higher level of need for
cognitive closure is accompanied by individual emphases on certain values (Conservation
and Self-enhancement)—then the current U.S. legal regime also reflects a political balance.
Hence, the political overtones of the stockholder-stakeholder debate are simply
manifestations of its underlying psychological foundations. No amount of economic analysis
is likely to be decisive in the eyes of people who disagree on what’s important in life.
Tetlock’s study demonstrates that these differences cut across many issues unrelated to
corporate governance. As for corporate governance, Berle has identified the second-best
solution. Subsequent developments in the American society apparently have not yet changed
its values to an extent that would cause it to reject the shareholder-primacy norm.
Finally, two general points deserve noting about conclusions that the present analysis
does not entail. First, the present theory improves our understanding of the mechanisms that
underlie the choice of maximands for corporate governance. This analysis does not imply,
however, that one version of corporate governance is universally better than the other. The
fact that some managers (or people in general) have a strong need for cognitive closure, that
they prefer security and conformity more than self-direction, etc., does not mean that they
would be worse managers. Indeed, the contrary may be true. These managers may also be
more decisive, better able to see through the details, and so on. In the same vein, higher
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Openness to change and lower need for cognitive closure may lead to procrastination – a bad
quality for managers.235
Second, it may be a mistake to attribute the value preferences and cognitive style
associated with either the stockholder or the stakeholder view to proponents of these views.
Thus, it would be wrong to assume that advocates of the single shareholder-value-maximand
position are all right-wing conservatives with low tolerance for ambiguity and nuance whose
early childhood development was somehow impaired.236 When the discussion revolves on
law- and policy-making, the crucial consideration is which policy would better fit the general,
average case. One can be of strong liberal persuasion and bent on dialectical reasoning yet
hold the view that American corporations had better be managed under a single-maximand
accountability regime. Adolf Berle is a shining example of the ability to draw the line
between one’s own values and optimal policy-making.

IV. MANAGEMENT THEORIES
Lawyers are not alone in addressing the maximands of corporate governance.
Beginning in the mid-1980s, a similar debate among management scholars has developed and
has been running on nearly parallel tracks to the legal discourse. Both strands of theoretical
analysis, however, feature their own versions of the monist, single-constituency shareholder
paradigm versus the pluralist, multiple-constituency stakeholder paradigm. However,
management scholars have made considerable progress with regard to the implementation
problem of reconciling multiple conflicting interests. These theories have gone virtually
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unnoticed among legal commentators237 although it bears important implications for legal
analysis. This Part aims to partially remedy this deficiency. Sections A through C review
current theories and Section D assesses them against the theory of values and cognitive style.

A. Stakeholder Theory
Edward Freeman’s landmark book Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach
marks the inception of the stakeholder-stockholder debate in management studies.238 This
book was written with a view to helping American managers cope with vast changes that had
taken place in their business environment, in particular the increase in the external demands
placed on the corporation in a turbulent period.239 “External change produces uncertainty,”
wrote Freeman, “It makes us uncomfortable because it cannot be readily assimilated into the
relatively more comfortable relationship with suppliers, owners, customers and
employees.”240 The stakeholder management approach advanced by Freeman thus was
designed to help managers reduce uncertainty and discomfort.241 At the center of this theory
stands the concept of stakeholders, defined as follows.
A stakeholder in an organization is (by definition) any group or individual who can
affect or is affected by the achievement of the organization’s objectives.242
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This definition implies that to the traditional list of stakeholders managers needed to
add governments, competitors, consumer advocates, environmentalists, special interest
groups, and the media.243 The crucial feature in this definition of stakeholders—and one that
has engendered heated controversies—is the fact that it is free of legitimacy considerations.
In fact, a stakeholder could be anyone – even a terrorist group. Freeman agnostically noted
that if a terrorist group could affect the corporation then managers couldn’t ignore it.244 One
needs only to consider discount airlines after September 11, 2001 to see the point.245
The original value-free, practice-oriented version of stakeholder management theory
soon gave rise to several branches of analysis that derived different theses from it.246 One
way to understand stakeholder theory is as a descriptive thesis, presenting models that
describe what the corporation is. Second, stakeholder theory is also an instrumental one,
namely, dealing with practical prescriptions for corporations’ survival and success in
business. The more contentious interpretations of stakeholder theory, however, are the

customers, suppliers, lenders and society. SRI’s work was heavily influenced by concepts that were developed
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normative and managerial theses. As a normative thesis, the theory’s focus is on the
legitimacy of claims on the corporation from various groups and individuals. In this view, the
theory implies that “each group of stakeholders merits consideration for its own sake and not
merely because of its ability to further the interests of some other group, such as
shareowners.”247 Finally, stakeholder theory can also be seen as implying a managerial thesis
in the sense of prescribing structures and practices for managing stakeholder affairs.248
The normative interpretation of stakeholder theory therefore rejects the idea of a
single maximand for corporate governance on ethical grounds. Although Freeman originally
did not develop this facet of his stakeholder management theory, the fields of business ethics
and business and society have embraced stakeholder theory and extensively rely on it. These
analyses infuse (or augment) the basic framework with value-based arguments that draw
heavily on notions of individual autonomy and fairness toward all societal members.249
Adoption and implementation of stakeholder management as a normative thesis require that
managers also subscribe to certain values and to “value-based-management.” Managers need
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to share a core set of values and incorporate these values as a key element of the strategic
management process.250
An important outcome of grounding stakeholder theory in normative propositions that
draw on values and ethics is that the theory immediately becomes political.251 This outcome
can hardly go unnoticed. However, one may find it difficult readily to classify the theory
along a left-right dimension. Freeman himself has provided different political interpretations
of stakeholder theory, ranging from liberal to libertarian interpretations.252 The liberal
element of stakeholder theory is based on the notions of autonomy, solidarity, and fairness as
articulated by John Rawls253 and others. This element entails pursuit of basic equality among
stakeholders in terms of their moral rights as these are realized in the firm.254 The libertarian
element of this theory is reflected in the theory’s reliance on a contractual model, which in
turn connotes values of liberty of will and personal freedom.255 It is worth noting that both
positions emphasize promotion of individual autonomy; they differ on the question of the
appropriate relations between the autonomous person and the larger society. Liberalism more
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than libertarianism calls on individual persons to consider other social members and
voluntarily promote their interests.
Ethical and philosophical considerations aside, stakeholder theory, as a managerial
thesis, puts the emphasis on the need to pay simultaneous attention to the interests of all
appropriate stakeholders.256 This aspect points to two separate challenges that must be met:
First, identifying all appropriate stakeholders, and second, managing these stakeholders. With
regard to the first challenge, the question “Who is a stakeholder?” has received numerous
answers over the years. While some scholars used narrow definitions that focused on the
legitimacy of stakeholders’ claims (determined on a legal or moral basis), others preferred a
broader definition (in line with Freeman’s original view) that emphasized the stakeholder’s
power to influence the firm’s affairs, whether or not these are legitimate claims.257
In addition, stakeholder management also has to deal with the problem of balancing
stakeholders’ conflicting interests beyond the general prescription of conducting a case-bycase analysis. What makes this a challenge is the fact that the theory “rejects the very idea of
maximizing a single objective function… Rather, stakeholder management is a never-ending
task of balancing and integrating multiple relations and multiple objectives.”258 Almost by
necessity, stakeholder theory faces severe implementation problems resembling those that
have encumbered multiple-constituency theories in corporate law for decades.

B. The Critique
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It should come as little surprise that stakeholder theory is not without opposition
among management scholars. The most prominent opponents probably are Elaine Sternberg,
a British commentator, and Michael Jensen, among the founding fathers of modern corporate
governance theory. Sternberg tends to emphasize the ethical aspects, arguing that stakeholder
theory cannot be justified. In brief, it is argued that the fact that some groups may have power
over the corporation does not give those groups legitimate authority over it, or the right to
hold it to account. Stakeholder theory, so runs the argument, is both “deeply dangerous and
wholly unjustified” because it “undermines private property, denies agents’ duties to
principals, and destroys wealth.”259
Jensen too employs strong language to criticize stakeholder theory, focusing primarily
on the problem of multiple maximands.
“What is commonly known as stakeholder theory, while not totally without content, is
fundamentally flawed because it violates the proposition that any organization must have a
single valued objective as a precursor to purposeful or rational behaviour… It is logically
impossible to maximise in more than one dimension at the same time… Telling a manager to
maximize [several objectives] leaves the managers with no objective. The result will be
confusion and lack of purpose that will fundamentally handicap the firm in its competition for
survival.”260

Jensen’s reasoning weaves together several arguments. First, there is an economic
theory argument, under which maximizing the firm’s financial value, defined as the sum of
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equity and other financial claims on the firm, is efficient.261 Second, there is a governance
argument, according to which mangers that owe duties to several stakeholders are
accountable to none and are bound to prefer their own self-interest.262 Third, Jensen makes a
political objection, because, as a basis for action, stakeholder theory politicizes the
corporation.263 Finally, and most important, Jensen makes a psychological argument.
Stakeholder theory is deficient under this argument because it confuses managers, and
confusion is bound to handicap the firm.264
Now these arguments all ring familiar, of course, as they replicate claims made by
lawyers since the inception of the Berle-Dodd dialogue. The novelty in Jensen’s position in
my mind lies not in the economic analysis (which is old, as Jensen indeed emphasizes) but
rather in the stress he puts on the psychological drawbacks of stakeholder theory. Moreover,
inspired by Friedrich Hayek’s work on the modern market economy,265 Jensen seems to hold
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that financial value maximization is sharp and modern while stakeholder management is not
only confusing but outright primeval:
“Stakeholder theory taps into the deep emotional commitment of most individuals to
the family and tribe. For tens of thousands of years those of our ancestors who had little
respect for of loyalty to the family, band, or tribe probably did not survive… Many People are
drawn to stakeholder theory through their evolutionary attachment to the small group and
family.”266

Notwithstanding the sharp differences between stakeholder theorists and their
opponents over the question “What are the right maximands?” both sides resemble in being
unable to provide satisfactory solutions for addressing non-shareholder constituencies. Even a
manager who is a staunch believer in shareholder value maximization somehow must deal
with workers, local politicians, NGOs, and so forth. To this end, Jensen advances what he
calls the “enlightened stakeholder theory.” This approach builds on stakeholder theory in
terms of designing ways for the firm to manage its relations with all-important constituencies
and adds to it the injunction that the maximand of the firms is its long-term market value.
This objective function, Jensen surmises, “gives managers a way to assess the tradeoffs that
must be made among competing constituencies.”267 Exactly how managers should assess this
tradeoff when long-term market value may call for sacrificing shareholder value remains
unspecified, however. Managers are left to their own devices.268

C. Toward a Dynamic Stakeholder Theory
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Like legal commentators, management scholars of all persuasions share the view that
corporate fiduciaries face multiple conflicting claims and interests, which they have to
identify and deal with on a constant basis. In contrast with legal commentators, however,
management researchers have made some progress toward addressing this challenge.
Mitchell, Agle, and Wood advance a model of stakeholder salience that covers both
stakeholder identification and stakeholder management. Mitchell et al. argue that the
stakeholder framework cannot readily explain the complex considerations that are involved in
giving priorities to competing stakeholder claims.269
Mitchell et al. claim that beyond identifying stakeholders using the standard test of
ability to affect and being affected, a managerial theory also needs to consider stakeholder
salience, namely, the factor that can explain to whom and to what managers pay attention.
Mitchell et al. propose that classes of stakeholders can be identified by three attributes: (1)
the stakeholder’s power to influence the firm; (2) the legitimacy of the stakeholder’s
relationship with the firm; and (3) the urgency of the stakeholder’s claim on the firm. These
three attributes together create different levels of stakeholder salience, which point out to
managers whom they should pay attention to.270
To define “power,” Mitchell et al. combine a variety of definitions, which, in the end,
all draw on Max Weber’s coceptualization of “the probability that one actor within a social
relationship would be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance.”271 This is
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essentially the definition advanced by Hohfeld earlier in the twentieth century.272 Weber’s
definition is broader in scope in that it also encompasses coercive uses of power, while
Hohfeld was interested only in legal relations. This notion of “power” is also central in the
concept of governance generally and corporate governance in particular.273
The attribute of legitimacy in Mitchell et al.’s theory loosely refers to socially
accepted or expected structures of behavior. The authors adopt a definition of legitimacy that
integrates several approaches that together refer to a generalized perception or assumption
about what is desirable, proper, or appropriate within a socially constructed system of norms,
values, beliefs, and definitions.274 Mitchell et al.’s definition of legitimacy is nearly identical
to definition of “social norms” and “culture” in social psychology and other social sciences. I
return to this aspect below. At this point suffice is to say that once a theory of stakeholder
identification is based on social norms and cultural values, it immediately ceases to be
universal and becomes contextual—thatis, it depends on characteristics that may (and do)
vary across societies and time.275
Finally, the attribute of urgency reflects the degree to which stakeholders’ claim call
for immediate attention. It combines a dimension of time sensitivity (how pressing is the
claim in that delays in addressing it would be damaging) and criticality (how important it is to
the stakeholder).
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The significant contribution of the stakeholder salience model lies in the distinction it
makes between stakeholders that deserve to be addressed (under any view of corporate
governance) and stakeholders whose claim actually gets to be addressed. Sometimes, a claim
that deserves attention gets neglected while managers invest resources in addressing a claim
that should have been ignored. The pivotal factor here is the managers. “It is the firm’s
managers who determine which stakeholders are salient and therefore will receive managerial
attention,” aver Mitchell et al. 276 Managers’ personal characteristics thus play a role as
moderators between stakeholders’ attributes in the abstract and corporate action. Managers,
however, vary greatly in their personal capabilities and values. A theory of stakeholder
management therefore must account for individual qualities of decision makers.
Empirical support for Mitchell et al.’s theory was provided by a study conducted by
Agle, Mitchell, and Sonnenfeld.277 These researchers further elaborate the mediating factor of
managers’ characteristics and argue that they are likely to be connected to managers’
individual values of self-interest versus other-regarding interest. They also assert that
managerial perception is critical to the salience of stakeholders and that values are critical to
perception.278 Agle et al. surveyed 70 CEOs out of 650 corporations in the Standard and
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Poor’s 500 list and 150 other large U.S. corporations.279 CEOs were asked to evaluate the
aforementioned attributes (power, legitimacy, urgency) for each of Freeman’s generic
stakeholder groups (shareholders, employees, customers, government bodies, and
community/charitable groups). The results provided strong support to the hypothesis that the
stakeholder attributes of power, legitimacy, and urgency are indeed related to stakeholder
salience. With regard to the moderating role of managers’ values, however, the overall
pattern of results was one of nonsignificance.280 Agle et al. also failed to find evidence for a
relationship between stakeholder salience and corporate performance and for a relationship
between CEO values and corporate performance.281

D. Assessment
The present theory of values and cognitive style lends itself to assessing the major
positions in management studies and to generalizing Mitchell et al.’s theory. When one
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considers Freeman’s stakeholder management theory and Jensen’s critique in light of the
present framework one can readily see how both are grounded in value preferences and the
need for cognitive closure. Freeman’s original theory is universal in that it does not hinge on
a particular profile of value preferences and cognitive style. Nor is this theory tailored to
societal values prevailing in the United States or in particular other countries.282 Stakeholder
theory is value-free but not value-neutral, however. Management in line with this theory is
bound to differ in accordance with particular managers’ individual characteristics and with
the cultural orientations of the country in which they operate. This framework, therefore, can
accommodate political positions but does not imply specific political persuasions.
In contrast, Jensen’s position reflects a view of managers as having only a specific set
of personal traits. Jensen portrays managers as individuals with strong preference for values
of security, tradition, and conformity (Conservation), and power, achievement, and hedonism
(Self-enhancement) and exceedingly high need for cognitive closure. By exaggeration,
Jensen’s repeating claim, that multiple stakeholders would confuse managers beyond control,
might sound as if managers cannot walk and chew gum at the same time. This position can be
justified only if one believed that this is a good portrait of the average American manager – a
belief that may depend on one’s own values and cognitive style.
One may further object to Jensen’s depiction of the emotions and values of
stakeholder theory supporters as vestiges of primeval times. This aspect is best understood
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against a theoretical backdrop of societal-level value dimensions. There is no denying that
communitarian commentators indeed support the multiple constituency version of corporate
governance.283 There is nonetheless a significant difference between stakeholder management
and ancient communal preferences. Depending on the context, a widely-followed injunction
to consider others may express cultural orientations of Embeddedness or Egalitarianism that
prevail in many advanced economies, although not in the United States.284 Stated otherwise,
stakeholderism can be as modern as shareholder primacy is.
Mitchell et al.’s stakeholder identification and salience model makes a significant
progress in the theory of corporate stakeholders by turning it from a static theory into a
dynamic one. According to this theory, two factors affect “who gets what” in the business
corporation: (1) the values of the society in which the corporation operates, and (2) the
personal characteristics of those who control the corporation, be they executive managers or
controlling shareholders. Thus, the theory encompasses both the societal as well as the
individual levels of analysis – a quality that virtually all the analyses in the legal literature
seem to lack. In addition, Mitchell et al.’s theory implies that at the individual level, several
factors may operate, including managers’ own personal values and their different levels of
urgency, or time pressures. It therefore comes close to identifying managers’ cognitive style
as potentially significant factor in the working of stakeholder management. Time pressure
and urgency increase the need for cognitive closure. Managers with higher levels of such
need may thus invest personal and corporate resources to deal with more pressing
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constituencies. They would tend to prefer a simple, single-maximand accountability regime
to one that features multiple maximands.285
Finally the present theory points to a possible reason for Agle et al.’s failure to find
supportive evidence in respect with a moderating role of managers’ values in determining
stakeholder salience. In order to capture managers’ values, Agle at al. used a limited set of
value items, which they culled from Rokeach’s value inventory.286 These items all reflect
values that belong to the Self-enhancement/Self-transcendence dimension.287 Agle et al.
failed to consider the Openness to change/Conservation dimension, which seems highly
relevant for managing multiple stakeholders and is related to the need for cognitive
closure.288 The value dimension framework thus makes it possible to identify such omissions
and to point out directions for future research.

V. A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
The debate over the maximands of corporate governance is no longer limited to the
United States. While the American corporate governance system adheres to shareholder
primacy, its German and Japanese counterparts feature strong protections for employees,
creditors, and other non-shareholder constituencies in general. These protections rest on a
combination of legal rules, structural arrangements, and informal social norms, sometimes
loosely referred to as culture. As it happens, the specific cases of the United States, Germany,
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and Japan represent wider groupings of corporate governance regimes. This Part
demonstrates the usefulness of the value dimension framework the analysis of comparative
issues. Section A begins with a comparative review of corporate governance groupings. This
is followed by an overview of the convergence dynamics in what regards stockholders versus
stakeholders in Section B.

A. Major Groupings of Corporate Governance
Systems of corporate governance similar to that of the United States exist in other
English-speaking countries, including the United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada.289 These
countries share a legal system that is based on English common law and equity principles (the
latter being especially influential in matters of corporate law due to historical reasons).
Shareholder primacy is the predominant norm in these countries.290 Subject to the legal
doctrine of separate corporate personality, shareholders are assumed to be the indirect owners
of the corporation and only they have voting rights on nominating the board of directors.291
Public companies in the U.S. and U.K. in particular tend to be internationally unique in that
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they have a widely dispersed shareholder body.292 Finally, The United Kingdom has its own
version of a Dodge-like precedent.293 This decision was followed by a legislative amendment
somewhat akin to American other-constituency statutes.294
In Western Europe, German corporate governance is a prime example of a
stakeholder-oriented system.295 German corporate law directs managers’ fiduciary duties to a
diverse group of multiple constituencies, including shareholder, employees, and society as a
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whole.296 The hallmark of the German system, however, is its codetermination regime, which
provides employees with structural protection through representation in corporate institutions.
Under German codetermination, firms have a two-tiered board structure. Companies are
governed by a managing board (Vorstand) that conducts the day-to-day business of the firm
and a supervisory council (Aufsichtsrat) that elects and monitors the firm’s management and
approves major corporate decisions. The German Codetermination Act of 1976 mandates that
fifty percent of the Aufsichtsrat of large firms be elected by shareholders and fifty percent by
employees, or by their delegates if the firm is very large.
Employee participation in the supervisory organ is also mandated (with qualifications)
in Austria, Denmark, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Sweden.297 In France,
Ireland, Portugal, and other EU Member States, the law includes aspects of employee
participation in corporate governance.298 It should be emphasized that membership in the
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supervisory board does not give employees formal decision power. Nonetheless, the
structural involvement of non-shareholder constituencies in firms’ governance is effective in
mitigating informational asymmetries and facilitates informal negotiations among corporate
constituencies.
Asian corporate governance systems are perhaps the least comprehensible to the
Western observer. For instance, both the Japanese and Korean models of corporate
governance rest on a statutory infrastructure that consists of a German-inspired civil and
commercial codes and an American-inspired corporate law. Both countries nonetheless have
developed corporate governance systems that differ markedly from the German and
American models, from one another,299 and from other Asian countries.300 Subject to these
reservations, corporate governance in Japanese and Korean corporations tends to rely more
extensively on interpersonal relationships. In Korea, these relationships are often based on
extended family (clan) kinship. Corporate groups are the predominant form of business
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organization. Both the Japanese keiretsu and the Korean chaebol exhibit extensive crossholdings among corporations that engage in a variety of industrial and financial activities.301
These Asian systems are generally perceived as stakeholder-oriented.302 Commentators
routinely make references to Asian cultures (especially to Confucianism with regard to Korea
and Japan) as the bedrock of corporate governance practices.303
The preceding sketchy portraits of corporate governance systems in English-speaking,
West European, and East Asian countries correspond with the cultural profiles of these
regions under Schwartz’s cultural-level model. Let us here focus on the English-speaking
versus West European regions.304 Although countries in these two groups are usually lumped
together as “Western,” Schwartz and Ros find that West European nations and Englishspeaking nations constitute culturally different regions that cannot simply be characterized as
“individualistic”.305 In a global comparison, countries in both regions attribute high
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importance to the two Autonomy orientations, with West European countries scoring
particularly high on Intellectual Autonomy. These regions part ways, however, in their
locations on the other two dimensions. West European countries attribute greater importance
to Egalitarianism and Harmony while English-speaking countries (especially American
samples) attribute greater importance to Hierarchy and Mastery.
As suggested by the theoretical analysis in Part II, the cultural differences between the
United States and Western Europe are consistent with the different positions among these
countries in regards with the maximands of corporate governance. West European countries
emphasize the more complex orientations in the two dimensions that concern interrelations in
and with the social and natural world. In contrast, the cultural profile of the United States
emphasizes less complex orientations that promote power and control while championing the
autonomy of the individual person. One can therefore expect that both regions will develop
accountability regimes, but that the European accountability will feature multiple
constituencies as accountees while the American accountability will seek to define power
hierarchies among constituencies. This is indeed the case.
In addition to promoting shareholder wealth maximization, the combination of
Autonomy and Hierarchy also may lead to greater tolerance toward hostile takeovers—a
hallmark of American and English corporate governance.306 Such tolerance reflects
acceptance of pursuit of wealth and power for the benefit of a single constituency or even few
individuals. This may be the case even if ensuing layoffs could be more disruptive in
comparison to layoffs in egalitarian societies that maintain better social safety nets.

105

Doubtless, tolerance toward the more hostile takeovers also conveys a societal taste for
Mastery, a value type that connotes exploitation. This and other typically American norms307
share an attitude of legitimation – ranging from deference to respect to admiration – of
individuals who take advantage of their wealth and/or power.
Among the socio-historical variables that might help to explain the unique value
profiles of Western Europe and the United States, Schwartz and Ros note that “[i]n Western
Europe more than in the United States, socialist governments that pursue the politics of the
welfare state emerged… [whereas in] the United States, perhaps due to impacts of the frontier
experience and of large corporations on societal developments, welfare socialism did not take
root.”308 This conjecture links culture and politics and supports Mark Roe’s political theory of
comparative corporate governance.309 According to Roe, the predominance of social
democracy in Western Europe explains the rejection of the shareholder wealth maximization
norm in countries like France, Germany, Italy, and in Scandinavia. The failure of social
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democracy to take root in the United State therefore enabled the rise of widely dispersed
shareholding and the adherence to shareholder wealth maximization.310

B. Seeming Convergence Trends
Major economic and geo-political processes have joined together during the 1990s to
broaden the scope of the stockholder-stakeholder debate such that today it spans the entire
globe. At the turn of the previous decade, the American economy was still struggling in the
wake of the turbulent downsizing period of the 1980s and was in fact heading toward a
recession. In contrast, the Japanese and German economies were then at the apex of an
unprecedented growth period. But then things changed. Japan declined into a deep recession
from which it has not recovered to this day. The collapse of the Soviet Bloc from 1989 to the
early 1990s created an urgent need for establishing market economies in former soviet
countries. The unification of Germany, which was part of this process, burdened the German
economy, while the United States began to grow briskly and re-assumed economic
leadership, particularly in hi-tech industries. To complete the picture, a series of financial
crises swept Latin America in the mid-1990s and in the late 1990s, another wave of financial
crises crippled Asian economies, including several “tiger economies” that were considered
poster children of economic growth, such as South Korea.
These events first engendered interest in non-American corporate governance systems
with a view to adopting successful features of foreign corporate governance in the United
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States. Comparative corporate governance was born as an academic field of interest.311 At
first, mostly lawyers were writing on these issues but in the mid-1990s economists too started
to show interest in comparative corporate governance.312 Corporate governance has drawn
tremendous attention in light of a growing consensus that an effective corporate governance
system may be a crucial precondition for a thriving market economy. By that time, however,
the German and Japanese corporate governance models have lost favor and the AngloAmerican model came to be seen as superior.313 Germany, along with other European
economies, began to embrace the Anglo-American “equity culture” that gives primacy to
shareholder value at the expense of other constituencies.314 Motivated by the evidence that
corporate governance matters for economic performance, international bodies began to
endorse corporate governance reform that draws on American features as a standard
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prescription for transition economies. International aid for distressed economies is
conditioned on implementing such reforms. Again, Korea is a prominent example.315
The shifts of attention, and favor, from American to non-American corporate
governance and back again to the American model were accompanied by parallel shifts with
regard to stockholder vs. stakeholder interest as the desirable maximands of corporate
governance. During the 1990s, corporate governance analysis entered a new phase when
study groups in the public and private sector alike began to promulgate codes of principles
for optimal corporate governance. The turning point was the 1992 Cadbury Report,
commissioned by the Financial Reporting Council, the London Stock Exchange and the
accountancy profession.316 It marked a conceptual change with regard to corporate
governance reform as it called for “soft regulation”—namely, the use non-binding rules and
practices—and underscored the importance of private, market-driven improvements in
corporate governance.
The Cadbury Report was followed by similar initiatives in many countries in
Europe317 and in other parts of the world, including Asia and Latin America.318 The large
majority of these documents have been promulgated since 1999, however. To understand the
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popularity of these “codes of best principles” one should be aware of two major factors that
provided strong incentives for countries and firms to follow this route. The first factor was
indeed market-driven. During the 1990s, institutional investors in the U.S. and the U.K. grew
in terms of the size of their managed funds and particularly the share of their portfolios
earmarked for foreign securities. Some of the largest institutional investors have adopted an
“active” investment policy that focused on corporate governance in their portfolio companies
and sought to improve it.319 These investors also drafted documents on optimal corporate
governance that dovetailed the Cadbury Report and its progeny. These two policies combined
together well to exert pressure on foreign corporations to adopt legal and structural measures
that would bring them in line with the recommended “optimum.” Investor associations
jumped the bandwagon and contributed their own documents.320 Building on these
developments, a new industry of corporate governance rating services has emerged, which
measures compliance with these principles as part of corporate governance consulting.321
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The picture would not be complete without considering the second factor, to wit, the
Principles of Corporate Governance adopted by the OECD Ministers in 1999.322 These nonbinding principles are intended to serve as a reference point for countries’ efforts to evaluate
and improve their own legal, institutional and regulatory framework. Shortly thereafter, the
OECD and the World Bank signed a Memorandum of Understanding. The signatory parties
agreed to adopt the OECD Principles as the point of reference in their corporate governance
reform initiatives in transition economies and developing countries.323 The parties also
established the Global Corporate Governance Forum with a similar mission statement.324
Moreover, CalPERS and other institutional investors adopted the Principles as guiding
principles for their corporate governance agenda for foreign portfolio companies.325 These
developments obviously have given the OECD Principles clout far exceeding their seeming
non-binding character. The Principles now constitute a benchmark for the myriad codes
around the world, which in 2003 numbered well over a hundred.326
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The upshot of the code of principles movement is that, either thanks to moral suasion
or due to pressure from markets and financial institutions, similar codes of principles are
peddled globally today as reflecting optimal corporate governance. These codes cover a
variety of issues but their dominant focus is on boards and board-related issues,327 with a
clear view to improving protection of public shareholders from managers and controlling
shareholders alike. This is both understandable and warranted if the concerns of institutional
investors are to be addressed such that they would be willing to invest in foreign equities. It is
debatable, however, how much of an impact this (apparent) budding consensus might have on
the issue of stockholder vs. stakeholder interests.328
The OECD Principles consider corporate stakeholders rather vaguely and halfheartedly. The Principles state at the outset that “[e]mployees and other stakeholders play an
important role in contributing to the long-term success and performance of the corporation,
while governments establish the overall institutional and legal framework for corporate
governance.”329 When it comes to implementation, however, the Principles adopt a complete
deference approach as they call for recognizing the rights of stakeholders but limit the latter
only to rights established by law. When law protects such rights, the Principles call for
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respecting them, albeit weakly, primarily through effective disclosure (transparency).330 The
difficult job of reconciling conflicting interests of various stakeholders is relegated to the
board of directors.331 It should be obvious at this point that in discharging this duty, directors
will be affected by their different values and cognitive styles.
Notwithstanding the OECD Principles, a comparative study of corporate governance
codes relevant to the European Union commissioned by the European Commission finds
differences in the legal status of stakeholders across Europe, in line with the above review.
The traditional differences between English and continental European corporate governance
in what regards non-shareholder constituencies remain intact notwithstanding calls in the
U.K. for assessing risks and opportunities for these constituencies.332 This study too points to
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national culture as underlying these differences.333 Moreover, in the wake of the EnronWorldCom wave of scandal, the pendulum seems to be shifting back as European fascination
with American corporate governance has abated considerably. The European Union recently
adopted a policy to promote corporate social responsibility (CSR), defined as “a concept
whereby companies integrate social and environmental concerns in their business operations
and in their interaction with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis.”334
A sober analysis of the code of principles movement therefore leads to the conclusion
that it has so far had a negligible effect on the stockholder-stakeholder issue. To paraphrase a
critique on the English supposedly pro-employee legislation, the stakeholder-related
provisions in the OECD Principles and the codes that follow them may be considered either
cynical or incompetent.335 In contrast with the issue of shareholder protection, on which
codes adopt strong normative positions intended to improve it, the codes either preserve
different national positions, or, in the case of international codes, fully defer to such
positions. Moreover, virtually no progress can be related to the code movement with regard to
resolving the implementation problem that has bedeviled proponents of other constituency
interests since the time of Berle and Dodd. In light of the cultural orientations to which these
issues are linked, this is not entirely surprising.

VI. CONCLUSION
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This article has sought to broaden our understanding the raison d’être of corporations
as it is reflected in the maximands of corporate governance. The debate over the appropriate
maximand has been raging for decades and is still taking place as vigorously as ever.
Advances in economic theory have not only failed to resolve this debate, but have established
that the problem is graver than what many may have estimated. Notwithstanding this
theoretical impasse, corporate managers and recently also policy makers around the world
face the maximands problem regularly.
This paper has put forward a new theory about the factors that determine these
maximands. Drawing on recent advances in psychological research, this theory points to
value emphases at the individual and societal levels and to the need for cognitive closure as
such factors. This theory further proposes the notion of complexity of values as an organizing
element that may associate certain value emphases with cognitive style. The present theory
aims to extend rather than replace economic analyses of the maximands issue. Overall, the
present theory is able to provide explanations for various features of the stockholderstakeholder debate in the United States and in international settings, to identify gaps in other
theoretical accounts, and to generate testable hypotheses for empirical research. Extant
evidence largely supports this theory.
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TABLES AND FIGURES
Table 1. The Schwartz Individual-level Value Types and Values that Represent Them
Self-Direction

Independent thought and action-choosing, creating, exploring
(creativity, freedom, independent, curious, choosing own goals)

Stimulation

Excitement, novelty and challenge in life (daring, a varied life, an
exciting life)

Hedonism

Pleasure and sensuous gratification for oneself (pleasure, enjoying
life)

Achievement

Personal success through demonstrating competence according to
social standards (successful, capable, ambitious, influential)

Power

Social status and prestige, control or dominance over people and
resources (social power, authority, wealth)

Security

Safety, harmony and stability of society, of relationships and of
self (family security, national security, social order, clean,
reciprocation of favors)

Conformity

Restraint of actions, inclinations and impulses likely to upset or
harm others and violate social expectations or norms (selfdiscipline, obedient, politeness, honoring parents and elders)

Tradition

Respect, commitment and acceptance of the customs and ideas that
traditional culture or religion provide (accepting my portion in life,
humble, devout, respect for tradition, moderate)

Benevolence

Preservation and enhancement of the welfare of people whom one
is in frequent personal contact (helpful, honest, forgiving, loyal,
responsible)

Universalism

Understanding, appreciation, tolerance and protection for the
welfare of all people and for nature (broadminded, wisdom, social
justice, equality, a world at peace, a world of beauty, unity with
nature, protecting the environment)
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Table 2. The Schwartz Cultural-Level Value Dimensions
Embeddedness/Autonomy This dimension concerns the desirable relationship between the
individual and the group. Embeddedness represents a cultural
emphasis on maintenance of the status quo, propriety, and
restraint of actions or inclinations that might disrupt the solidary
group or the traditional order. The opposite pole describes
cultures in which the person is viewed as an autonomous,
bounded entity who finds meaning in his or her own uniqueness.
Hierarchy/Egalitarianism

This dimension refers to guaranteeing responsible behavior that
will preserve the social fabric. Hierarchy represents a cultural
emphasis on obeying role obligations within a legitimately
unequal distribution of power, roles, and resources.
Egalitarianism represents an emphasis on transcendence of
selfish interests in favor of voluntary commitment to promoting
the welfare of others.

Mastery/Harmony

This dimension refers to the relation of humankind to the natural
and social world. Mastery stands for a cultural emphasis on
getting ahead through active self-assertion whereas Harmony
represents an emphasis on fitting harmoniously into the
environment.

Table 3. The Hofstede Cultural-Level Value Dimensions
Individualism/Collectivism Valuing loosely knit social relations in which individuals are
expected to care only for themselves and their immediate
families versus tightly knit relations in which they can expect
their wider in-group (e.g., extended family, clan) to look after
them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty;
Power Distance

Accepting an unequal distribution of power in institutions as
legitimate or illegitimate

Uncertainty Avoidance

Feeling uncomfortable or comfortable with uncertainty and
ambiguity and therefore valuing or devaluing beliefs and
institutions that provide certainty and conformity.

Masculinity/Femininity

Valuing achievement, heroism, assertiveness, and material
success versus relationships, modesty, caring for the weak, and
interpersonal harmony.

Long-Term Orientation

Having a long-term time orientation; emphasizing Confucian
work ethics such as thrift and persistence.
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Figure1. The Structure of Relations Among Individual Values
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Figure2. The Structure of Relations Among Cultural Orientations
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